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INTRODUCTION
In 1896, Justice Harlan dissented against the "separate,
but equal" doctrine established by Plessy v. Ferguson, I saying,
[Iun view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In re-
spect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
2
It took the Supreme Court over sixty years to finally overrule
the "separate, but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,3 but only twenty-one years later in 1975, the Court itself
established another doctrine that downgraded people of His-
panic origin to second-class citizens.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,4 the Supreme Court
sanctioned the use of "apparent Mexican ancestry" as a valid
factor in an inmigration law enforcement officer's analysis on
whether to detain a suspected undocumented immigrant be-
cause "[tlhe likelihood that any given person of Mexican ances-
try is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor."5 Through the years, this ethnic classification
has evolved without any explanation in the courts into its cur-
rent vague and all-encompassing form: "Hispanic appear-
ance.'"6 This unclear and over-generalized ethnic classification
is still widely used today by the United States Border Patrol
(USBP) in their immigration investigatory stops7 and upheld on
a daily basis by federal courts around the country, especially
those courts located in the southern border.
The "Hispanic appearance" classification must raise con-
cerns for all people of Hispanic origin and minority groups
around the country. Both 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and 8 C.F.R. § 278.1
authorize USBP to conduct immigration investigatory stops of
individuals suspected to be aliens within a 100-mile border
zone along the United States border." While most of the immi-
2 I& at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
3 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
4 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
5 Id. at 885-87.
6 See Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
7 The label of"immigration investigatory stops" throughout the Note refers to
those Terry investigatory stops conducted by USBP officers to question individu-
als about their immigration status. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
8 With respect to powers of the immigration officers and employees, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (1994) provides:
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regula-
tions prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without
warrant-
(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his
right to be or to remain in the United States;
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the
territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft,
conveyance or vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles
140320191
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gration investigatory stops take place within the southern bor-
der, the 100-mile border zone extends the USBP's
authorization to conduct these stops within 100 air miles of the
Canadian border, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, as well
as within the perimeters of Alaska and Hawaii.9 According to
the American Civil Liberties Union, "[r]oughly two thirds of the
United States population lives within the 100-mile border
zone[,... [tlhat's about 200 million people."10 As these figures
suggest, USBP officers patrol more than just the border.
Although the USBP's mission of finding and locating un-
documented immigrants has been an issue for the agency since
its inception, the recent harsh immigration policies of the
Trump Administration have sparked fear in immigrant commu-
nities nationwide. Under the Obama Administration, immigra-
tion law enforcement agencies were previously instructed to
prioritize locating and deporting undocumented immigrants
with criminal backgrounds. I' However, the Trump Adminis-
tration now has issued new guidelines to these agencies that
empower them to "target, detain and deport any of the millions
of immigrants currently in the United States without documen-
tation, including those without past criminal convictions."12 In
addition, some of the Trump Administration's objectives in im-
migration law enforcement include recruiting 5,000 new USBP
from any such external boundary to have access to private lands,
but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent
illegal entry of aliens into the United States; [and]
(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed and
which are cognizable under any law of the United States regulating
the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens.
The Attorney General has authorized Border Patrol officers to act as Immigration
officers. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(I) (1974). The "reasonable distance" mentioned in
§ 1357(a)(3) is 100 air miles. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (1999).
9 See Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara,
84 YALE L.J. 355, 357-58 (1974).
10 The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https: //www.aclu.org/other/constitution- 100-mile-border-zone [https://perma
.cc/74MP-ZAZ6] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). Nine of the ten largest U.S. metro-
politan areas fall within the 100-mile border zone: New York City, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego and San Jose.
Id.
11 See Wesley Lowery, Federal Agents Ask Domestic Flight Passengers to







officers by lowering their hiring standards1 3 and "[ilncreas[ing]
northern border security."
14
On their face, these policies seem to only target undocu-
mented immigrants nationwide. However, the reality is that
immigration law enforcement agencies currently enforce these
policies in a way that also harms U.S. citizens and documented
immigrants from minority groups.15 Current enforcement of
these immigration policies harms members of minority groups
because of deeply flawed and outdated legal standards-like
the Hispanic appearance classification-that should not per-
sist under today's vastly different circumstances.
There is no better example that illustrates the insidious-
ness of the enforcement of these flawed and outdated legal
standards than the USBP's immigration investigatory stops on
domestic travelers at the Transportation Security Administra-
tion's (TSA) pre-boarding screening checkpoints at airports,
typically along the southern border. These immigration inves-
tigatory stops occur frequently and are based solely on the
travelers' race and ethnicity, 16 but perhaps most importantly,
13 See Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Vivian Yee
& Ron Nixon, To Detain More Immigrants, Trump Administration to Speed Border
Hiring, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/1
2 /us/
trump-immlgration-border-hiring.html [https: //perma.cc/3D8Y-CEXA].
14 Trump Administration Immigration Policy Priorities, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief
ing-statements/trump-administration-imigration-policy-priorities [https://per
ma.cc/GR3D-ESSW].
15 See, e.g., Alvaro Huerta, The 'War on Immigrants': Racist Policies in the
Trump Era, HUFFINGTON POsr (Aug. 7 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/the-war- on-immigrants-racist-policies-in-the-
trump us_5980bf68e4b0d187a596909b [https://perma.cc/8TUF-B9S8] (argu-
ing that the immigration policies of the Trump Administration have become highly
"racialized" through the President's rhetoric of "anti-Mexicanism and Is-
lamophobia"); NANCY MORAWETZ, ANNA SCHOENFELDER & NATASHA RIVERA SILBER,
N.Y.U. L. IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC, UNCOVERING USBP: BONUS PROGRAMS FOR UNITED
STATES BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND THE ARREST OF LAWFULLY PRESENT INDIVIDUALS 1
(2013) [hereinafter "UNCOVERING USBP"] ('Those caught in USBP's dragnet include
U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, tourists, student visa-holders and per-
sons with proper authorization to work in the United States.").
16 See, e.g., Jnjoo Lee, Cornel Graduate Students Arrested Near U.S.-Mexico
Border, CORNELL DAILY SUN (Mar. 27, 2013), http://cornellsun.com/2013/0
3 / 2 7 /
cornell-graduate-students-arrested-near-u-s-mexico-border/ [https://perma.cd/
BHV8-UKLJI (describing how two Cornell graduate students were arrested after
they refused to answer a USBP officer's questions at the TSA checkpoint about
their citizenship status at a Texas airport); Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border




KVA3-YXGGj (describing how USBP even stopped and refused to let Cameron




the circumstances under which the USBP conducts these im-
migration investigatory stops and the legal basis sanctioning
them render the Fourth Amendment's safeguards of domestic
travelers ineffective. 17
TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints usually follow the
same security procedures in every airport in the United
States.'8 Travelers wait in line with their carry-on luggage
along corridors formed by retractable belt stanchions to be
called by TSA officers at their podiums. 19 Once at the podiums,
travelers must show a form of identification and their airline
tickets to the TSA officer before proceeding to the conveyor belt,
where travelers place their belongings-including their shoes-
and proceed to an x-ray scanner.20 After successfully passing
through these security procedures, travelers proceed to a
boarding gate and board their flight.2 1 However, some airports
located near the U.S.-Mexico border are different from other
airports around the country in that USBP officers are stationed
at these TSA checkpoints.22 Officers position themselves be-
tween the TSA podiums and the conveyor belt, and they take
advantage of the compulsory circumstances of the TSA check-
point environment to conduct their own "random" immigration
investigatory stops on unsuspecting travelers.23 With an up-
coming surge in recruitment for USBP officers and a harsher
enforcement of these immigration policies,2 4 potentially all air-
ports in most major U.S. cities within the 100-mile border zone
will have USBP officers stationed at their TSA pre-boarding
screening checkpoints, who will be authorized to arbitrarily
stop and harass millions under the pretext of border security.
This Note argues that USBP immigration investigatory
stops conducted in TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints at
airports in the southern border are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and that the current standard for USBP to
conduct an immigration investigatory stop is antiquated and
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part I briefly discusses
17 See infra Parts III and IV.
18 See, e.g., JBG TRAVELS, 3046 Going Through TSA Security Check Point,
YoUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watchv=t7fBqju2GJY
[https://perma.cc/MM27-TAWX] (depicting the TSA security screening process at




22 See Yardley, supra note 16 ("[USBP] [algents are posted in the airport and
bus station and along highways ...
23 See infra Part III.
24 See Yee & Nixon, supra note 13.
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the history of the USBP and its focus on Mexican and Hispanic
immigrants. Part II examines law enforcement's application of
the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard, focusing on its application in the context of immigration
law enforcement and each of the different types of immigration
investigatory stops delineated by the Supreme Court. Part III
examines the legal standards sanctioning TSA pre-boarding
screening checkpoints and describes how USBP details con-
duct immigration investigatory stops in these checkpoints.
Part IV argues that the USBP's immigration investigatory stops
at TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because of the compulsory con-
ditions of the TSA checkpoint and the manner by which USBP
officers conduct these stops. Finally, Part V argues that the
Hispanic appearance classification in the current reasonable
suspicion standard to stop suspected undocumented immi-
grants violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause because it is not narrowly tailored to further border
security and reduce overall illegal imnigration.
I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL
AND ITS IMPACT IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER
A. The Early Beginnings of the United States Border
Patrol
The USBP was formed in 1924 to enforce U.S. immigration
restrictions by patrolling the borderland regions to prevent un-
authorized border crossings and arresting people defined as
unauthorized immigrants by the Immigration Act of 1917.25
Most of the USBP's first members were part of the Anglo-Ameri-
can working class who had all grown up in the southern bor-
derlands and with white violence against Mexicans.26 In the
early days, although the agency's migration control mandate
came from Washington, D.C., the USBP started as a decentral-
ized outfit with practices and priorities that were "primarily
local creations."27 The decentralized practices of the agency's
outfits and the broad migration control mandate gave the
USBP a rough start "defined by disorganization and an over-
arching lack of clarity."
28
25 8 U.S.C. § 142-155 (1917); KELLY LYrLE HERNANDEZ, MIGRAI A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. BORDER PATROL 1-2 (2010).
26 LYTLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 42-43.
27 Id. at 8.
28 Id. at 34.
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Just one year later, USBP officers already had a broad
authority to interrogate, detain, and arrest any person they
suspected of committing a violation of U.S. immigration law. In
1925, Congress enacted legislation establishing the USBP's law
enforcement authority, which invested USBP officers with
broad powers of arrest without a warrant of suspected aliens
entering or attempting to enter the country in violation of immi-
gration law.29 Although initially restricted to the border-
lands,30 court holdings helped extend the USBP's authority to
conduct arrests without a warrant beyond the border crossings
and into the interior of the country. For instance, in Lew Moy
v. United States,3 1 the Eighth Circuit held that the consumma-
tion of a conspiracy to bring undocumented immigrants does
not take place at the illegal border crossing, but until the un-
documented immigrants reach their destination in the interior
of the country.32 Through this interpretation of illegal immi-
gration, the holding gave the early USBP mandate an unde-
fined massive jurisdiction to work on around the country.33
Consequently, USBP officers started patrolling backcountry
trails, conducting traffic stops on major borderland roadways,
and conducting warrantless arrests of suspected aliens beyond
the borderlines and into the greater borderlands region.34
B. The United States Border Patrol's Focus on Mexican
Immigrants
The USBP's focus on targeting Mexican immigrants first
began during the 1920s, when population figures for border
communities with people of Mexican descent were compared to
the government's estimates of unsanctioned border crossers
that had evaded the USBP.35 Any estimates of growth in these
Mexican communities were attributed to illegal immigration,
and therefore, government agencies concluded that no other
29 Id. at 35 ("[USBP] officer[s] [were] authorized to 'arrest any alien who in his
presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of
any law or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission of
aliens, and to take such alien Immediately for examination before an immigrant
inspector or other official having authority to examine aliens as to their rights to
admission to the United [SItates.'").
30 See id.
31 237 F. 50 (8th Cir. 1916).
32 Id. at 52 ("Successfully to consummate the unlawful introduction of the
prohibited aliens required more than the mere bringing of them across the line. It
was necessary to evade the immigration officials by transporting them into the
interior and concealing their identity.").
33 LYTLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 35.




group but Mexican nationals in the southern border had been
engaging in unauthorized border crossings in the region.
3 6
This narrow enforcement of immigration laws in the borderland
regions, sanctioned by the government in Washington, linked
illegal immigration directly to Mexicans and people of Mexican
descent.37 As USBP officers were pulled back from the border-
line to start patrolling the greater borderland regions, they
started questioning hundreds of thousands of local people,
broadly policing Mexican mobility rather than patrolling the
political boundary between the United States and Mexico.
38
As a result of the agency's link between illegal immigration
and Mexican descent, the USBP started using race and ethnic-
ity as an indicator of illegal entry or the individual's immigra-
tion status.3 9 USBP officers would use the stereotypical profile
of the "Mexican Brown"-"about 5'5" to 5'8"; dark brown hair;
brown eyes; dark complexion"-to detain individuals and in-
quire about their immigration status.40 Ironically, many Mexi-
can immigrants were actually "white and even blue-eyed" and
did not fit with this stereotypical profile given their mixed-race
roots because of their Native American and European origins.
4 1
USBP also used the profile of "Mexican Brown" as an excuse to
enforce their other border responsibilities, like smuggling and
contraband, both activities that intersected with undocu-
mented immigration.42 USBP Chief Inspectors and Commis-
sioners continuously upheld the USBP officers' use of race and
ethnicity while reviewing cases involving people of Mexican de-
scent-even in those cases which, according to Chief Inspector
Chester C. Courtney from the El Paso Station in 1927, would
have been thrown out on account of illegal searches "[hiad the
... persons been white Americans."
43
36 Id.
37 Id. at 50.
38 Id. at 46.
39 Id. at 48.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id. at 30. Social class was also a factor behind the stereotype of "Mexican
Brown." In the highly racialized social organization of the South, middle-class
people of Mexican descent were described as "Spanish" or "Spanish American"
and were considered equals among whites, while, in contrast, lower-class people
like Mexican laborers were poor, were dark-skinned, and did not speak English.
Id. at 30, 42-43.
42 See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Proce-
dure, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1543, 1585 (2011).
43 LYRLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 48.
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C. The United States Border Patrol Today
By the 1960s, the USBP had become a complex law en-
forcement agency with a massive infrastructure built around
the focus of illegal immigration in the southern border.44
Training for the officers in immigration law enforcement also
improved, but the practice of using the "Mexican Brown" profile
was still in use and deeply rooted in the practices of USBP.4 5
For USBP officers, "any connection between whiteness and ille-
gal[] [immigration]" was laughable, and as one officer is quoted
saying:
[Ajfter 13 years of doing this, I can't really describe, it's a gut
feeling, a hunch. I can walk downtown El Paso and walk by a
lot of people and know they are legal... [and] all of a sudden,
one will be by me or passing in front of me, that I just know
doesn't have documents.4
6
Meanwhile, statistics showed that there was a drop in the num-
ber of apprehensions of undocumented immigrants.47
Then, in July 1960, Edgar C. Niehbur-the assistant chief
of USBP at the time-researched birth and immigration records
from people of Mexican origin in the borderland states, and
according to his research, he found that many people claiming
to be U.S. citizens were actually false claimants, and thereby
"fraudulent citizens."4 8 Niehbur's purported findings provided
an explanation for the drop in the number of apprehensions of
undocumented immigrants, reflecting how "illegals who once
swam, climbed, and hiked across the border" were now avoid-
ing detection under the cover of fraudulent documents.49 By
1964, all USBP officers were trained in analyzing and identify-
ing fraudulent documents and were instructed to "find the
frauds who were hiding among the citizens and legal immi-
grants," intensifying the link between illegality and Mexican
origin.50 Toward the 1980s and '90s, Mexican-American com-
44 Id. at 198.
45 Id. at 199.
46 Id. at 199-201.
47 Id. at 203-04.
48 Id. According to Niehbur, "one in four filings for birth certificates between
May of 1954 and April of 1957 were fraudulent claims to American birth or
citizenship. Considering that between 1940 and 1960 the state of Texas issued
one hundred and ninety thousand birth certificates to persons of Mexican origin,
[he] argued that a considerable number of persons ... were actually ... fraudu-
lent citizens." Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 204. This issue continues to this day, as passport applicants with
official U.S. birth certificates-most, if not all, Hispanic-are being jailed in immi-
gration centers and entered into deportation proceedings after being accused of
1410 [Vol. 104:1401
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munity leaders began to complain about the continuous USBP
practices of harassing Mexican-Americans and legal immi-
grants in business districts and residential areas within border
cities.5
1
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in 2003, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, all the immigration-related functions performed
by the INS were transferred to three new agencies under the
command of the DHS: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) (the head branch of the USBP), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service (USCIS), and U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE).52 By 2014, USBP had over 21,000
officers, almost all of them along the U.S.-Mexico border.5 3 Al-
though the number of USBP officers along the U.S.-Canada
border has historically been more limited, the current "Mexi-
canization" of the northern border has driven security anxieties
of the USBP and led the agency to increase the number of




THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN IMMIGRATION
LAw ENFORCEMENT
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect
In 1891, Justice Gray wrote about the Fourth Amendment
that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law."5 5 The Fourth Amendment protects
people from unreasonable searches and seizures and estab-
using fraudulent birth certificates since they were born. See Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is
Denying Passports to Americans Along the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship into
Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
the americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-
their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1 d630e84-aOda- 11 e8-a3dd-2a 19
91 f075d5_story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=.9e9c73 1 ee8aa [http://perma
.cc/W5AD-V6NY]. Even a current state prison guard who was a former service
member and also a USBP agent was denied a U.S. passport and accused of using
a fraudulent birth certificate. Id.
51 LYrLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 228.
52 Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REv. 1, 11 (2014).
53 Id. at 12.
54 Id. at 13.
55 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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lishes that no warrants shall issue unless supported by oath or
affirmation setting forth facts that establish probable cause.
56
Accordingly, courts have reasoned that warrantless searches
and seizures are reasonable as long as they are supported by
probable cause.57 The probable cause requirement is fulfilled
when "'facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable cau-
tion in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed."58
All arrests are seizures, but not all seizures are arrests.
Brief detentions short of traditional arrest are deemed
seizures.59 Law enforcement officers effectively seize people
whenever the officers accost individuals and restrain their free-
dom to walk away.60 The Supreme Court's decision in Terry v.
Ohio created a less stringent standard than probable cause for
temporary investigatory seizures and patdowns called "reason-
able suspicion."6 1 This new standard requires only that "[law
enforcement] officer[s] observe[ I unusual conduct which leads
[them] reasonably to conclude in light of [their] experience that
criminal activity may be afoot."62 Whether officers have devel-
oped sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct these investi-
gatory stops depends on the totality of the circumstances.
6 3
When assessing individuals, trained and experienced law en-
forcement officers make objective observations and consider
the modes or patterns of certain lawbreakers, which lead the
officers to draw inferences and make deductions that might not
be discerned by the untrained or inexperienced individual.64
However, when a "stop is not based on objective criteria, the
risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable
limits."65
56 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The protections of the Fourth Amendment are
enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because they are "implicit In 'the concept of ordered liberty.'" Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
57 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
58 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (alterations in
original) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
59 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment is implicated even when an officer's conduct falls short of a "technical
arrest" or a "full-blown search").
60 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
61 See id. at 26-27.
62 Id. at 30.
63 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
64 Id.
65 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
[Vol. 104:14011412
"TRAVELING WHILE HISPANIC"
Although probable cause is more stringent than reasona-
ble suspicion, both standards deal with probabilities and not
hard certainties.6 6 Given other facts observed, whenever law
enforcement officers notice any additional relevant facts that
increase the likelihood that an individual has committed, is
committing, or will be committing a crime, then they develop
sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion to perform a
seizure.6 7 Therefore, probability acts as a constraint in the
totality of circumstances analysis, as law enforcement is forced
to separate those facts that contribute to the likelihood of crim-
inal conduct from those that do not.68 The calculations of
these probabilities are neither mathematical nor technical, but
rather are factual and practical considerations that are "com-
monsense" to trained and experienced law enforcement of-
ficers.69 For example, a police officer might observe a person
running down the street and make no inference from that fact
alone. However, if the police officer had previously heard on
dispatch that someone was mugged in the street from where
the running person came from, then the likelihood that the
running person was involved in the mugging increases.
The combinations of facts that can increase the likelihood
that an individual has committed, is committing, or will com-
mit a crime are unlimited. Law enforcement officers conduct
investigatory stops by relying on their observations of the indi-
vidual's characteristics and conduct and of the environment
where they observe the individual.70 However, the reasonable
suspicion standard is supposed to consider the totality of these
observed circumstances objectively, but it is only through the
individual law enforcement officer's mental process that these
circumstances are analyzed, and thereby, the totality of the
circumstances test constantly runs the risk of becoming sub-
jective.71 The main problem with the standard becoming more
subjective is that a law enforcement officer's suspicion may be
impacted by the officer's own bias or misperception-whether
conscious or unconscious-and not necessarily by enhanced
intuition obtained through police training or experience.72 For
66 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
67 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect 93
YALE L.J. 214, 217 (1983).
68 See id.
69 See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
70 See Johnson, supra note 67, at 218.
71 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
72 See Andrew Jay Flame, Criminal Procedure-Drug Courier Profiles and
Terry-Type Seizures-United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484 (2d. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 663 (1991), 65 TEMP. L. REv. 323, 336-37 (1992).
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instance, a white law enforcement officer might describe in
court an otherwise normal behavior of a Hispanic individual as
a "furtive gesture," which might only be a misconstruction
probably originating from the cultural differences between the
officer and the individual.73 Indeed, this oversight of the stan-
dard sometimes gives way to "permissible" racial profiling of
suspects.
Furthermore, the deference that courts give law enforce-
ment officers in the reasonable suspicion analysis exacerbates
the problem of the standard becoming subjective. When of-
ficers need to justify an investigatory stop that may be border-
line unreasonable, they may do so by either "reciting
characteristics that [they] know[ I the court will accept . . . [or
by] fabricat[ing] characteristics in order to meet the reasonable
suspicion standard." 74 This issue is constantly raised in drug
courier cases, where law enforcement officers stationed at air-
ports watch for travelers matching the "drug courier profile": a
set of characteristics and behaviors which officers, based on
their collective experience, have identified as typical of people
carrying illicit drugs.75 Some courts have recognized that the
"drug courier" profile characteristics are often difficult to dis-
tinguish from "reasonable innocent behavior" and that officers
tend to classify their suspects' conduct and demeanor as "ner-
vous," "brisk[ I," or "furtive[ I" in order to fit them within the
profile's characteristics and justify their stop.
7 6
For instance, in United States v. Lopez,77 two USBP agents
stopped a vehicle because they became suspicious after the
driver avoided eye contact with them.78 In Lopez, the Fifth
Circuit explained that in a previous case, it held that the appel-
lant glancing repeatedly and nervously at a USBP agent was a
valid factor raising the agent's suspicion of wrongdoing.7 9 Now,
in Lopez, the government was asking the Fifth Circuit to find
that a driver's failure to look at the USBP officers was also a
valid factor raising an agent's suspicion of wrongdoing.8 0 The
court explained that by holding that both factors were valid in
73 See Johnson, supra note 67, at 239.
74 See Flame, supra note 72, at 336-37.
75 Id. at 323 n.7.
76 See United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Garvin, 576 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 n.1 (N.D. In. 1983); United States v.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
77 564 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1977).
78 Id. at 711.
79 United States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1977).
80 See Lopez, 564 F.2d at 712.
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the reasonable suspicion analysis, all drivers would be placed
in "a most precarious position."1 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
held that where a reasonable suspicion factor and its opposite
can both be used by law enforcement officers to justify stopping
an individual, then both factors lose their probative value.
8 2
These flaws in the reasonable suspicion standard are only com-
pounded when law enforcement officers are allowed to use race
and ethnicity as a valid supporting factor in their decision to
detain a suspect, especially in the context of immigration law
enforcement, as the next section will explain.8 3
B. The Decision to Detain a Suspect in the Context of
Immigration Law Enforcement
Immigration law enforcement agencies derive their author-
ity from the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes
them to exercise certain powers without a warrant.84 Immigra-
tion officers have broad interrogation powers that authorize
them to interrogate, without a warrant, any aliens or people
they believe to be aliens as to their immigration status.8
5 Im-
migration officers also have broad search powers that authorize
them to board and search "any vessel[,] ... railway car, aircraft,
conveyance, or vehicle . . . for the purpose of patrolling the
border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens."8 6 Yet, these broad
interrogation and search powers can only be exercised "within
a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the
United States,"8 7 which the United States Attorney General de-
fined to be 100-air miles.8 8 However, the Supreme Court has
defined the scope and limits of these powers according to three
different situations and their particular circumstances.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 712-13.
83 Another huge issue is raised when law enforcement is allowed to use race
or ethnicity as a valid factor raising reasonable suspicion: pretext to conduct a
stop. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[The Constitu-
tion prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis.").
84 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1994).
85 Id. § 1357(a)(1).
86 Id. § 1357(a)(3).
87 Id.
88 See 8 C.F.R_ § 287.1 (1999).
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1. International Ports of Entry and Functional
Equivalents of the Border
The first situation involves border crossings at interna-
tional ports of entry. Inmigration law enforcement officers are
not required to have a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion when conducting stops of individuals, vehicles, and
conveyances at the border or at international port of entries
because these stops are considered to be "reasonable" since
"the person or item . . . entered into our country from
outside."8 9 According to the Supreme Court, this border
search exception "is grounded in the recognized right of the
sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed
by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country."90
Congress recognized this right of the sovereign and extended
the Executive branch "plenary authority to conduct routine
searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or
a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to
prevent the introduction of contraband into this country."9 1
Furthermore, whenever considering any balancing test, the
"Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted
persons and effects is at its zenith at the international bor-
der"9 2 and therefore, "the expectation of privacy is less at the
border than it is in the interior."
93
Yet the Supreme Court has held that different legal stan-
dards apply for detentions of property and individuals when
these detentions go beyond the scope of routine border
searches. In United States v. Flores-Montano,94 the Court up-
held the search of a vehicle in which the border authorities
disassembled it and removed its gas tank, seizing thirty-seven
kilograms of marijuana as a result.95 The Court's reasoning
was that the interference with the possessory interest in a vehi-
cle crossing the border into the country is justified by the "Gov-
ernment's paramount interest in protecting the border."
9 6
However, in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,97 the
Court did require officers to have reasonable suspicion of pos-
89 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
90 Id. at 620.
91 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-17).
92 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
93 Id. at 154.
94 Id. at 149.
95 Id. at 150.
96 Id. at 155.
97 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
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sible drug smuggling whenever the detention of travelers at the
border "[goes] beyond the scope of a routine customs search
and inspection."98 Montoya de Hernandez involved the deten-
tion of a traveler who had arrived at the Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport from a flight that departed from Colombia and
aroused the suspicion of customs officials for being a drug
smuggler.9 9 Although her traveling documents were in order,
the officials were suspicious of the traveler's peculiar answers
to their questions about her trip, for which they conducted a
patdown and strip search that eventually led to the discovery of
balloons containing cocaine hidden in her alimentary canal. 10 0
Therefore, even at the border, officials are required to have
reasonable suspicion for those prolonged detentions that are
more intrusive in nature for individuals than the routine deten-
tions that are expected in the border.
Montoya de Hernandez also shows another important as-
pect of the border search exception: the exception also applies
to the "functional equivalents" of the border.10 1 The Supreme
Court has held that "functional equivalents" of the border can
include: (1) stations near the border at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border-
which can be both permanent and temporary-and (2) stations
in airports located inside the country where incoming interna-
tional flights arrive after a nonstop flight from a foreign coun-
try. 10 2 But the Court did not enumerate a list of factors to
determine what stations were "functional equivalents" of the
border, except for holding that a roving patrol did not fall
within the definition. 10 3 The lack of clarity on what stations fit
the classification of a "functional equivalent" of the border has
frustrated lower courts in their attempts to classify the differ-
ent kinds of stations-including domestic fixed check-
points'04-in their controlling districts.
For instance, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are split on what
circumstances make an interior checkpoint a "functional
98 Id. at 541.
99 Id. at 533-34.
100 Id. at 534-36.
101 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
102 IcL It is important to note that the Court in Almeida-Sanchez did not hold
that any airport inside the country and its installations as a whole where nonstop
international flights arrive is a functional equivalent of the border. The Court only
established that the "passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving" at an interior
airport are within the functional equivalent of a border search.
103 Id.
104 See infra II.B.2.
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equivalent" of the border. In United States v. Jackson, 1 0 5 the
Fifth Circuit held that for an interior checkpoint to fit the clas-
sification of functional equivalent of the border, "the govern-
ment must demonstrate with 'reasonable certainty' that the
traffic passing through the checkpoint is 'international' in
character."'10 6 In contrast, in United States v. Bowen,10 7 the
Ninth Circuit held that if the interior checkpoint was "at a
location where virtually everyone searched has just come from
the other side of the border, [then] the [interior checkpoint] is a
functional equivalent of a border search."'10 8 Although both
circuit courts set different standards, both had the same ratio-
nale in mind. The Fifth Circuit explained that the purpose of
the reasonable certainty standard is to limit the functional
equivalents of the border to "intercept no more than a negligible
number of domestic travelers."10 9 Like the Fifth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit explained that the purpose was to limit func-
tional equivalents of the border from intercepting "a significant
number of ... domestic travelers going from one point to an-
other within the United States."110 Moreover, both circuit
courts agree that if any interior checkpoint oversteps this limi-
tation, then they lose their classification as functional
equivalents of the border."'
Finally, it is important to note that since circuit courts
have different standards for classifying stations or interior
checkpoints as functional equivalents of the border, this fact
means that not all stations or interior checkpoints are func-
tional equivalents of the border. Furthermore, this fact also
means that those stations and interior checkpoints that have
been classified by courts to be functional equivalents of the
border might lose their classification depending on the nature
of the traffic crossing these checkpoints. In fact, in Jackson,
the Fifth Circuit was not only changing its standard for func-
tional border equivalency, but also changing the classification
of the Sierra Blanca checkpoint located in Texas.
1 12 Ulti-
mately, these classifications are subject to change depending
on the district's population in which the checkpoints are lo-
cated, and therefore, the larger the concentration of domestic
105 825 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987).
106 Id. at 860 (emphasis added).
107 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), affd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
108 Id. at 965 (emphasis added).
109 See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 860.
110 See Bowen, 500 F.2d at 965.
111 See id.; Jackson, 825 F.2d at 859-60.
112 See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 854.
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travelers crossing these checkpoints, the more likely courts will
avoid classifying them as functional equivalents of the border.
2. Domestic Fixed Checkpoints
As explained briefly above, the second situation involves
domestic fixed checkpoints in the interior of the country. Im-
migration law enforcement agencies conduct surveillance in
two types of checkpoints: "[plermanent checkpoints . .. main-
tained at certain nodal intersections" and "temporary check-
points [that] are established from time to time at various
places."113 These interior checkpoints were implemented by
immigration law enforcement agencies, specifically USBP, to
contain the flow of undocumented immigrants within the dis-
tricts closest to the border 1 4 because "[o]nce the illegal alien
gets settled in a big city far away from the border it becomes
very difficult to apprehend him."115 Their primary purpose is
"to intercept vehicles or conveyances transporting illegal aliens,
or nonresident aliens admitted with temporary border passing
cards." 1 6 Therefore, USBP selects the locations for permanent
checkpoints based on the following set of factors:
1. A location on a highway just beyond the confluence of two
or more roads from the border, in order to permit the check-
ing of a large volume of traffic with a minimum number of
officers. This also avoids the inconvenience of repeated
checking of commuter or urban traffic which would occur if
the sites were operated on the network of roads leading from
and through the more populated areas near the border.
2. Terrain and topography that restrict passage of vehicles
around the checkpoint, such as mountains ....
3. Safety factors: an unobstructed view of oncoming traffic,
to provide a safe distance for slowing and stopping; parking
space off the highway; power source to illuminate control
signs and inspection area, and bypass capability for vehicles
not requiring examination.
4.... [Tlhe checkpoints, as a general rule, are located at a
point beyond the 25 mile zone in order to control the unlaw-
ful movement inland of such visitors. 1
7
USBP uses the same factors when selecting locations for their
temporary checkpoints, although the two distinguishing fac-
tors between permanent and temporary checkpoints are that
113 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
114 See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (S.D. Cal. 1973).





temporary checkpoints are located on roads where traffic is
less frequent and that they are "set up at irregular intervals
and intermittently so as to confuse the potential violator."118
Finally, these domestic fixed checkpoints have similar accou-
terments, like warning signs ahead of the checkpoints indicat-
ing their existence and informing travelers crossing the
checkpoint of the officials' authority and that they may be
stopped for a limited inquiry. 119
The Supreme Court has also set different standards for
stops and searches of vehicles crossing through these check-
points. In United States v. Ortiz,120 the Court held that USBP
cannot, in the absence of consent or probable cause, search
vehicles at these interior checkpoints and the functional
equivalents of the border. 121 The Court's reasoning was based
on the notion that "a search, even of an automobile, is a sub-
stantial invasion of privacy.' 12 2 However, for immigration in-
vestigatory stops, the Court held in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte123 that USBP officers at these checkpoints and at func-
tional equivalents of the border124 were able to conduct immi-
gration investigatory stops, including referrals to a secondary
inspection area for a limited nonintrusive inquiry, without a
warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.125 The
Court's reasoning in Martinez-Fuerte was that requiring these
stops to be based on reasonable suspicion would be impracti-
cal to enforce due to the heavy flow of traffic and because it
would not effectively deter the "well-disguised" operations of
smugglers and undocumented immigrants traveling to the in-
terior of the country. 1
2 6
Furthermore, the Court held in Martinez-Fuerte that these
investigatory stops were not intrusive searches because "[aill
that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a response to a
brief question or two and possibly the production of a docu-
ment evidencing a right to be in the United States"-although
118 Id.
119 I& at 407.
120 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
121 Id. at 896-97.
122 Id. at 896.
123 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
124 It is important to note that Martinez-F'uerte did not hold that these domes-
tic fixed checkpoints are functional equivalents of the border. The Supreme Court
has not offered any guidance on how to classify what checkpoints can be func-
tional equivalents of the border, and therefore the circuit courts are currently split
on the factors supporting such a classification. See supra Part II.B. 1.
125 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562-64.
126 Id. at 557.
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the Court did not explain which documents could prove this. 1
27
The Court also explained that these checkpoints are less intru-
sive and frightening than roving patrols because "motorist[s]
can see that other vehicles are being stopped, [they] can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and [they are] much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."128 Moreo-
ver, the Court explained that these checkpoints have: (1) mini-
mum potential interference with legitimate traffic because
"[mlotorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as
they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of these
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere;" and (2) a regu-
larized manner of operations that "appear to and actually in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity" and is
"reassuring to law-abiding motorists[ ] that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest." 129 Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that with these considerations in
place, it was unlikely for USBP officials to locate a domestic
fixed checkpoint "where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on
motorists as a class."'130
Finally, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte held that neither type
of checkpoint requires prior authorization by warrant because
the reasonableness of their stops depends on factors like the
location of the checkpoints and the methods used in their oper-
ation. 131 Therefore, this last holding in Martinez-Fuerte allows
the review of the stops conducted by USBP at these check-
points based on the factors listed previously in the opinion. 1
32
3. Roving Patrols
Lastly, the third situation occurs during roving patrols-
whenever immigration law enforcement officers stop a moving
vehicle already inside the United States to question the occu-
pants about their citizenship. 133 In United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 134 the Supreme Court held that the standard of reason-
able suspicion applies whenever officers conduct roving pa-
trols, holding that "officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
127 Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 559.
130 Id.
131 I& at 565.
132 Id. at 565-66.
133 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975).
134 Id at 873.
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rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally
in the country."135 The Court found that requiring reasonable
suspicion for these stops "allows the Government adequate
means of guarding the public interest and also protects re-
sidents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interfer-
ence" and concluded that it is not "'reasonable' under the
Fourth Amendment to make such stops on a random basis."136
The holding in Brignoni-Ponce also provided immigration
law enforcement agencies with a set of valid factors in the rea-
sonable suspicion standard to consider in their decision to stop
a vehicle for purposes of immigration law enforcement.13 7
Among these include: (1) "characteristics of the area in which
they encounter a vehicle" (proximity to the border, patterns of
traffic, and previous experience with alien traffic); (2) "informa-
tion about recent illegal border crossings in the area"; (3) "[tlhe
driver's behavior" (erratic driving or attempts to evade officers);
(4) "[alspects of the vehicle itself' (certain vehicles with large
compartments may be used for transporting concealed aliens,
the appearance that the vehicle might be heavily loaded, or the
extraordinary number of passengers); and, most importantly,
(5) an individual's "apparent Mexican ancestry."138
Although the Court made clear that conducting an investi-
gatory stop solely relying on the "apparent Mexican ancestry" of
those individuals stopped would neither justify a reasonable
belief that they were aliens or were concealing other aliens
illegally in the country, it nevertheless allowed ethnicity to be a
valid factor in the reasonable suspicion standard. 139 To sup-
135 IcL at 884.
136 Id. at 883.
137 Id. at 884-85.
138 I& at 884-86. Another one of the holdings in Martinez-Fuerte was that
even if referrals to secondary inspection by USBP officers in domestic fixed check-
points were largely based on an individual's "Mexican appearance," the use of race
and ethnicity did not violate the Constitution. The Court reasoned that these
types of intrusions (stops and secondary inspections) are sufficiently minimal
when used in a combination to the other factors delineated by the Court in its
opinion in Martinez-Futerte. See supra Part II.B.2. However, as this Note argues,
the use of race and ethnicity through the "Hispanic appearance" factor does
violate the Constitution. See infra Part V.
139 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885. Allowing immigration law enforce-
ment to use race or ethnicity in the reasonable suspicion standard allows officers
to use federal immigration enforcement as a pretext for investigating other crimes,
like drug distribution or possession, even If the basis for the immigration "crime"
was weak. See Carbado & Harris, supra note 42, at 1585; see also Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that a police officer's subjective
intentions to conduct a stop play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis as long
as the stop was supported objectively).
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port this holding, the Court cited population statistics from the
southern-border states of people of Mexican origin and those
registered as aliens,140 and concluded that "[tlhe likelihood
that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor."
14 1
Moreover, the Court endorsed the Government's assertion that
trained immigration law enforcement officers "can recognize
the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico,
relying on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut."'
142
The "apparent Mexican ancestry" factor in Brignoni-Ponce
has transformed over the years in the courts. First, the stan-
dard set by the Court in Brignoni-Ponce only applied to vehicles,
but was later extended to pedestrian stops by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 143 Then, the term "apparent Mexican ancestry" evolved
into "Mexican appearance,"'44 later equated first to "Latin ex-
traction,"'145 and then to the term used today by the majority of
the courts: "Hispanic appearance."146 However, neither the
courts nor immigration law enforcement agencies have ever
explained why these terms have been equated or whether of-
ficers are trained or experienced enough to distinguish between
them. To this day, the Ninth Circuit has been the only court to
recognize that "Hispanic appearance," just like any other factor
in the reasonable suspicion standard, loses its probative value
as it is "likely to sweep many ordinary citizens into a generality
140 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886 n.12.
141 Id. at 886.
142 Id. at 885. The Court cited the Reply Brief for the United States in the case
United States v. Ortiz where the Government asserted the following:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has informed us that
experienced Border Patrol officers look for persons with the charac-
teristic appearance of Mexican residents an appearance that distin-
guishes those persons from the thousands of Mexican aliens who
lawfully reside in this country and the thousands of American citi-
zens of Mexican ancestry. Illegal Mexican entrants commonly ap-
pear thin, their hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in
a characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in full-cut
and coarsely-woven material. Experience has shown we are told,
that illegal entrants may exhibit obvious nervousness or affect ex-
cessive nonchalance as they approach a checkpoint.
Reply Brief for the United States, United States v. Ortlz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (No.
73-2050), 1975 WL 184933, at *12-*13.
143 See Ill. Migrant Council v. Piliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976)
(holding that "Mexican appearance" alone did not provide the basis for reasonable
suspicion in pedestrian stops).
144 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 571 (1976).
145 See United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
146 See Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
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of suspicious appearance,"147 and therefore, has found that
"Hispanic appearance" is, in general, of such little probative
value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify an
investigatory stop. 14
8
Considering these three types of immigration investigatory
stops, this next section of the Note will now describe how stops
are conducted at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints.
The section that follows it will then argue that the stops con-
ducted at TSA checkpoints closely match and resemble roving
patrol stops because of the surrounding circumstances behind
them.
III
How USBP IMMIGRATION INVESTIGATORY STOPS AT TSA
CHECKPOINTS ARE UNIQUE
A. The Airport Environment and TSA Checkpoints
Since September 11, 2001, airport security has become
more than ever a primary concern for Congress and the Execu-
tive branch. In reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in Novem-
ber 2001.149 The Act established the TSA and gave the agency
the responsibility of "detecting and thwarting potential ter-
rorists" through the use of pre-boarding screening procedures
at all U.S. airports.150 In fact, by statute, the Under Secretary
of the TSA requires airports to refuse transporting travelers
who are not subjected to a search that is intended to detect if
they are carrying or concealing "a dangerous weapon, explo-
sive, or other destructive substance."'1
147 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992)).
148 Id. at 1135; see also Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 463-64
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Montero-Camargo with approval, and noting that it would
be particularly inappropriate to extend its statistical rationale to circumstances
involving the seizure of persons of Arab ancestry at an airport where "the likeli-
hood that any given airline passenger of Arab ethnicity is a terrorist is so negligi-
ble that Arab ethnicity has no probative value").
149 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)-(c) (2016); Bethany A. Gulley, Note, Criminal
LAw-No Right to Revoke and Avoid Search-Ninth Circuit Rules that Consent o
Airport Screening Cannot Be Revoked in an Administrative Search. United States v.
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007), 31 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV. 515, 521
(2009).
150 See Gulley, supra note 149, at 521.
151 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1) (2001).
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1. TSA Checkpoints and the Administrative Search
Exception
These searches conducted by TSA officiers at the pre-
boarding screening checkpoints in airports are constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment based on the administrative
search exception.152 The Supreme Court first established the
constitutionality of the administrative search exception in
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 1 53 where it held that administrative searches are reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment because they are conducted
as part of general regulatory schemes to further an administra-
tive purpose rather than as part of a criminal investigation to
obtain evidence of a crime. 154 The Court in Camara also held
that the need to search must be balanced against the intrusion
it entails for these searches to fall under the administrative
search exception.1 55 The Supreme Court later held that
searches could be classified as administrative searches "where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspi-
cionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasona-
ble'-for example, searches now routine at airports and at
entrances to courts and other official buildings."
15 6
Then, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Davis
157
that the searches conducted at the TSA pre-boarding screening
checkpoints were constitutional under the administrative
search exception because:
[The] screening searches of airline passengers are conducted
as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of
weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent
hijackings. The essential purpose of the scheme is not to
detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who
carry them, but to deter persons carrying such material from
seeking to board at all. 15
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit in Davis found that pre-board-
ing screening searches met the balancing test for reasonable-
ness in Camara because "[tlhe need to prevent airline hijacking
152 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
153 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
154 Id. at 538.
155 Id. at 536-37.
156 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (citing Nat'l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-76, 675 n.3 (1989).
157 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
158 Id at 908.
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was unquestionably grave and urgent" and that the search of
all passengers and their carry-on articles was "reasonably nec-
essary to meet the need."' 59 However, the court also held that
the pre-boarding screening searches were only constitutionally
reasonable as long as they were "no more extensive nor inten-
sive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives."160 The Ninth Circuit also
recognized that "routine airport screening searches will lead to
discovery of contraband and apprehension of law violators" but
that nonetheless, if "the screening of passengers and their
carry-on luggage for weapons and explosives [is] subverted into
a general search for evidence of crime," then courts would ex-
clude the evidence obtained. 161
Finally, in United States v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit held
that the reasonableness of a pre-boarding screening search
does not depend on a traveler's consent, and thus, the only
requirement for the search to be reasonable was the traveler's
election to attempt to enter the "secured area" of an airport,
which is under current TSA regulations and procedures, when
a traveler walks through the magnetometer or places items on
the conveyer belt of the x-ray machine. 162
B. USBP Officers Stationed at TSA Checkpoints
USBP officers conduct immigration investigatory stops at
the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints under unique cir-
cumstances that are not relatable to those in the other three
types of immigration investigatory stops described earlier. At
airports in cities located within the 100 miles from the south-
ern border, TSA checkpoints have USBP "details" that station
their officers within the bounds of the TSA checkpoint.163
Since the purpose of the TSA officers is to detect the presence of
weapons, explosives, or any object that travelers might smug-
gle or conceal in their belongings or persons-including drugs
or currency-and local police officers are present to arrest any
159 Id. at 910.
160 Id. at 913.
161 Id. at 908-09; see also United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d
1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an airport pre-boarding screening search
was outside the scope of an administrative search because the search was a tool
of a criminal investigation where law enforcement officers and Flight Terminal
Security (FTS) personnel were working together, and if an FTS officer found crimi-
nal activity while searching passengers, then the FTS officer would get a reward).
162 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007).
163 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing at 15-16,
United States v. Mangal, No. 16-CR-00324 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 2016) (describing
what these airport USBP details are).
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traveler who is discovered of attempting to do so, the only in-
ferred purpose explaining the USBP's presence at TSA check-
points is to conduct immigration investigatory stops. 164
1. The Typical TSA Checkpoint in an Airport Located in
the Southern Border
Typically, TSA checkpoints start at the lines formed by the
retractable belt stanchions at the entrance to the boarding gate
area, for which all travelers must pass through the TSA check-
point without exception.16 5 Along the retractable belt stan-
chions, there are warning signs about TSA safety procedures
and protocols, informing travelers about the checkpoint's pur-
pose and procedures and informing them of the items that are
permitted or prohibited at the checkpoint. 166 No warning signs
informing travelers of USBP presence, purpose, procedure, or
authority are present. 167 After travelers wait in line along the
corridors formed by the retractable belt stanchions, they are
then called by TSA officers at their podiums. 168 Once at the
podiums, travelers must show a form of identification and their
airline tickets to the TSA officer before proceeding to the con-
veyor belt, where travelers place their belongings, including
their shoes, and then proceed through the x-ray scanner. 169
TSA requires every traveler who is eighteen years old and
older to show valid identification in order to travel. 170 TSA has
a list of valid forms of identification that may be shown to the
TSA officer at the podium in order to travel, which includes
driver's licenses from all states, passports (U.S. or foreign-is-
164 Id. at 16 ("The airport detail entails assisting TSA. And we check-we
oversee the people that are traveling have proper documents to travel within the
United States."); see also What Does Border Patrol Do at Airports, Other Domestic
Checkpoints?, MERCURY NEWS (July 17, 2014), https://www.mercurynews.com/
2014/07/17/what-does-border-patrol- do-at-airports- other- domestic-check-
points/ [https://perma.cc/3TWU-MKM4] ("[USBP agents] check passports, green
cards, and other forms of identification while standing over the shoulder of a TSA
agent. Essentially, agents are on the lookout for suspicious behavior such as
extreme nervousness or appearing to be lost. If an agent sees that such a person
presents a green card but looks nervous, the agent would likely question that
person.").
165 See JBG TRAVELS, supra note 18.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163 at 54-55 (describing how there are no warning signs alerting to the presence,
purpose, procedure, or authority of USBP officers at the airport).
168 See JBG TRAVELS, supra note 18.
169 Id.
170 See Identification, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/secur-




sued), USCIS-issued identifications for legal aliens (permanent
resident card, employment authorization), and border crossing
cards for nonresident alien Mexican nationals, among
others. 171 Accordingly, as long as these individuals show any
of the other forms of valid identification, TSA does not require
individuals who are traveling domestically to show their pass-
port to board their flights. 172 However, this policy does not
apply to non-resident aliens, who either will show their foreign-
issued passports or border crossing cards in the case of Mexi-
can nationals. 173 In addition, TSA does not require legal aliens
who are traveling domestically to show their USCIS-issued
identifications or their foreign-issued passports to board their
flight, as long as legal aliens show any of the other forms of
valid identification, most commonly a state driver's license or
ID and even a U.S. Department of Defense ID for those legal
aliens serving in the Armed Forces.
When travelers present their valid forms of identification
and their airline tickets to the TSA officer at the podium, the
TSA officer first checks that the names in the airline tickets
matches the ones in the travelers' form of identification and
then that the form of identification is valid and not fraudulent,
verifying the micro prints and other features of the IDs with the
help of special lighting equipment.174 After the TSA officer in
the podium verifies the travelers' IDs, travelers proceed to the
conveyor belt where they place their belongings, including their
shoes, in trays for them to be scanned by the x-ray scanner.
After placing their belongings in the trays, travelers wait for
another TSA officer to call them to go through a magnetometer
and a CAPS-Il body scanner.175 If any issues arise during
these procedures, TSA officers might refer travelers to further
inspections in an attempt to solve any issues. After travelers
and their belongings successfully pass through all security
procedures, including any further inspections, then the TSA
officer allows them to grab their belongings and proceed to
their boarding gate.
'71 Id.
172 See Four Tips to Remember When Checking Your ID at Airport Security,
TRANsP. SEC. ADMIN. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2018/08/02/four-
tips-remember-when-checking-your-id-airport-security [https: //perma.cc/855V-
JZYR] (noting that TSA just requires one acceptable form of identification).
173 Id.




2. USBP Officers and Their Activities in the TSA
Checkpoints
As mentioned above, USBP officers are stationed within the
bounds of the TSA checkpoint but they are not specifically
assigned to a specific area, since the officers are usually walk-
ing around the TSA checkpoint and approaching individuals to
question them.176 USBP officers commonly position them-
selves around the area between the TSA podiums and the con-
veyor belts.1 77 Some USBP officers stand right beside or
behind the TSA officers at the podiums to inspect the travelers
and their identification. 178 The purpose is to observe the forms
of identification travelers show to TSA to discern which trav-
elers are aliens and then decide whether to question them
about their legal right to be in the country. 179
If USBP officers cannot immediately discern whether trav-
elers are aliens through the IDs they showed at the TSA po-
dium, officers will use other means to identify travelers that
might be aliens and that need to be questioned about their
right to be in the country. 18 0 The most obvious factors USBP
officers most likely will observe first from travelers are their
race and ethnicity. Officers then might likely observe the trav-
elers' behavior as they approach them. Just like in the other
types of immigration investigatory stops, USBP officers watch
out for any behavior from the travelers that the officers inter-
pret as "nervous," "brisk," or "furtive." 18 Furthermore, many
travelers board flights accompanied by relatives or friends, al-
lowing USBP officers to listen carefully to the way travelers are
speaking and to perceive whether they are speaking in a lan-
176 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163 at 16, 56 (describing where USBP details position themselves at the El Paso
International Airport); Transcript of Jury Trial Testimony at 12, Texas v.
Figueredo, No. 2013-CCR-5357-C (Cameron Cty. Ct. Apr. 7, 2014) (describing
where USBP officers stand at the Brownsville South Padre International Airport).
177 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163, at 16, 56 (describing where USBP details position themselves at the El Paso
International Airport).
178 See, e.g., Omar Figueredo (@elOmarFigueredo), TWlITER (Apr. 5, 2018, 1:00
AM), https: / /twitter.com/elOmarFigueredo/status/981803872325795840/
photo/1 [http://perma.cc/C88G-ETZB] (depicting a USBP officer standing right
next to a TSA officer at a podium).
179 See Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note 163, at
16-17.
180 See Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note 163, at
58-61.
181 IcL (describing what USBP officers look for to justify an Immigration investi-
gatory stop at the airport).
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guage other than English, English with a "foreign accent" or
with a poor ability to speak English. 182
USBP officers also regularly interact with the travelers as
they go through the TSA checkpoint. Sometimes USBP officers
might directly approach travelers and start asking them about
their travel plans or immigration status.'8 33 However, most of
the time, USBP officers interact with travelers as they go
through the TSA checkpoint under the guise of aiding travelers
in following the TSA procedures or in speeding up the screening
process. 18 4 The real purpose behind these interactions is for
travelers to expose themselves by revealing information that
USBP officers might interpret and use in their decision to de-
tain and question them for their immigration status or right to
be in the country. For example, USBP officers would walk be-
tween the TSA podiums and the conveyor belt, approach trav-
elers that look disoriented or those not following TSA
procedures appropriately, and tell these travelers what to
do. 18 5 Finally, USBP officers are also just walking around
these two checkpoint areas and making themselves available
for any questions the travelers might have, which might be
more convenient for the officers when they later detain a trav-
eler and explain in their reports that it was the traveler who
initiated a "consensual" interaction with them. 186
C. Omar and Nancy
The story of Omar Figueredo and Nancy Morales illustrates
how USBP officers conduct these immigration investigatory
stops at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints. In addi-
182 See, e.g., Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Stopping Americans for Speaking
Spanish. The Latest Evidence That Border Patrol Agents Have Too Much Power,
Vox (May 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/5/21/17376436/border-pat
rol-agents- stop -american-women-speaking-spanish-montana [http://perma.cc/
J739-9ZKW] (reporting that two American women were stopped in a small town in
Montana after they were speaking Spanish); Deyvid Morales, Greyhound and
Border Patrol, YouTUBE (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOD
jPpTrZiY [http://perma.cc/ZHU6-WDNV (depicting a passenger who asks a
USBP officer conducting an immigration investigatory stop inside an Amtrak train
what would raise their suspicion of undocumented immigrants, and the USBP
officer answers "Accent.").
183 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163, at 17 (describing the types of "basic questions" they ask travelers as they go
through the TSA checkpoint).
184 Id. at 19.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 63. Although these USBP techniques do not appear to be unreasona-
ble at first, this Note wifl argue why these techniques are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See infra Part IV.
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tion, their story shows an example of the legal consequences of
refusing to answer a USBP officer's immigration questions, and
how the USBP "free-rides" on the conditions of the TSA check-
point and the airport environment to coerce travelers into an-
swering their questions about immigration status.
In March 2013, two Hispanic Cornell University students,
Omar Figueredo and Nancy Morales, traveled to Brownsville,
Texas to visit family. 18 7 After the couple stayed with Omar's
family for a couple of days, Omar and Nancy were ready to fly
back to Ithaca, New York to resume their studies.188 Their
flight was departing from the Brownsville South Padre Island
International Airport, just a couple of miles away from the
southern border across the Mexican city of Matamoros.18 9
Omar and Nancy arrived at the airport early in the morning,
checked in their luggage, and then proceeded to the pre-board-
ing TSA screening checkpoint. 190
The pre-boarding security checkpoint at Brownsville South
Padre Island International Airport follows the same security
procedures as any other airport in the United States.19 1 How-
ever, the TSA checkpoint at the Brownsville South Padre Island
International Airport had USBP officers stationed within its
bounds. 192 The USBP officers in this case were walking around
the retractable belt stanchions and would position themselves
right between the end of the waiting line and the TSA
podiums. 1
93
Omar and Nancy were making the way along the retracta-
ble belt stanchions towards the TSA checkpoint, until they
were stopped by a USBP officer before they could reach the
podium.19 4 The USBP officer then asked Omar and Nancy
whether they were U.S. citizens, but Omar politely refused to
answer the question. Omar has had enough previous en-
counters with the USBP throughout his lifetime to know that
the USBP kept harassing him because of the way he looks. 1
95
187 See Transcript of Jury Trial Testimony, supra note 176, at 54.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 I& at 54-56.
191 Id. at 57.
192 Id. at 6 ("[Tihe two border patrol agents that are on duty, they're assigned to
check citizenship or ask for U.S.-they ask 'U.S. Citizen?'"), 58 ("There were two
border patrol agents standing several paces ahead of the TSA agents that we were
going to-that we were planning to show our IDs and boarding passes to.").
193 Id. at 11-12. In fact, after waiting in line, travelers must first pass through
the USBP area before getting to the TSA podiums. Id. at 26.
194 Id. at 58.
195 Id. at 68-69.
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Omar, a proud American, 196 was tired of living in fear and
believed he was standing up for his rights under the Constitu-
tion by refusing to answer the question.19 7 During previous
encounters with the USBP in different circumstances, like rov-
ing patrols, Omar had politely refused to answer the same
question and he was let go without any consequences. 198
Yet, the USBP officer surprised Omar by telling him and
Nancy that he was not going to let them through because they
refused to answer his question. 199 Confused, Omar asked the
officer why they could not go through if they were not under
arrest, and the officer then told him that he, Omar, was being
detained.2 ° ° After Omar and Nancy had a lengthy discussion
with the USBP officer that made the travelers in the line behind
them angry, the officer eventually let Omar and Nancy return to
airport's main entrance to allow other travelers through.20 1 Re-
gardless, the damage was already done because Omar and
Nancy had already missed their flight.
20 2
After they were let go and later rebooked their flight, Omar
and Nancy waited in line along the retractable belt stanchions
once again to proceed to the TSA checkpoint.20 3 However, they
were both stopped again by another USBP officer, who also
asked them about their immigration status.20 4 Omar again
politely refused to answer the question.205 The officer detained
them again and told them they would not be able to go through
until they answered the question.20 6 Another lengthy discus-
sion ensued, but by now, local police had been alerted by the
USBP officers about the situation.20 7 In the end, the local po-
lice officers arrested Omar for obstructing a public passageway
196 Id at 96.
197 Id. at 64, 68-69, 77-80. Even while in northern New York, Omar has been
stopped by the USBP officers to inquire about his citizenship. Id. at 64.
198 I& at 67-68.
199 Id. at 59, 61, 62.
200 I& at 62.
201 Id. at 61.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 69-70. Omar's testimony also corroborates that the only way to get to
the TSA podiums was to go through the area where the USBP officers were sta-
tioned. Id. at 89.
204 Id. at 70.
205 Id. at 71.
206 Id. at 21, 71-72, 85, 91-92. In fact, the USBP officer told Omar numerous
times that he was being detained and that he was not free to leave because "he
was not following the protocol at the airport for the border patrol agent." Id at 21.
207 The police officer had advised Omar that his conduct could be considered
disorderly conduct or breach of the peace and could be arrested. Id. at 28.
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and Nancy for interference with public duties.20 8 Nancy was
able to record the moment officers arrested Omar, and Nancy,
frustrated and defenseless, kept asking: "What is the crime?l
What is the crime?"20 9
IV
USBP IMMIGRATION INVESTIGATORY STOPS AT THE TSA
CHECKPOINTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. USBP Immigration Investigatory Stops at TSA
Checkpoints Closely Match and Resemble Stops
Made During Roving Patrols
The manner in which USBP officers conduct immigration
investigatory stops at the TSA checkpoints does not match or
resemble the conditions of stops made at the international
ports of entry, functional equivalents of the border, or domestic
fixed checkpoints. Therefore, this Note argues that these stops
most closely match or resemble the conditions of a roving pa-
trol. Consequently, USBP officers are required to have suffi-
cient reasonable suspicion that an individual is illegally
present in the country before conducting an immigration inves-
tigatory stop. Considering the objective inference that travelers
within the TSA checkpoint who are questioned about their im-
migration status are not free to leave until they relent and
answer the officers' questions, and the limited articulable facts
USBP officers can observe and obtain under these circum-
stances to raise their suspicion of undocumented immigrants,
these immigration investigatory stops are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
1. The USBP Immigration Investigatory Stop at the TSA
Checkpoint Does Not Match or Resemble the
Characteristics of a Stop at an International
Port of Entry or a Functional Equivalent
of the Border
Immigration investigatory stops conducted by USBP of-
ficers at TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints do not fit
208 Id. at 32. The police officer that arrested Omar testified that he knew the
USBP officer who had stopped Omar the second time was planning on taking him
into custody as soon as the flight he was supposed to board finished boarding. Id.
at 22.
209 See Democracy Nowl, EXCLUSIVE: U.S. Citizens Arrested at Airport for




under the border search exception of the Fourth Amendment
because airports, as a whole, are not international ports of
entry or functional equivalents of the border. Since all airports
are inside the boundaries of the Unites States and travelers
using U.S. airports as their airport of origin are not entering the
country from the outside, the TSA checkpoints cannot be inter-
national ports of entry.2 10 Even those airports located within
100 air miles from the border are still not considered interna-
tional ports of entry because 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) explicitly
limits the power of immigration employees to "board and
search for aliens" inside dwellings without a warrant or proba-
ble cause.2
11
Furthermore, no TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint is
likely to be classified as a functional equivalent of the border
because interior airports do not meet the standards of the Fifth
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. While the Supreme Court held in
Almeida-Sanchez that searches of "the passengers and cargo of
[the] airplane[s]" from incoming flights that arrived after a non-
stop flight from a foreign country to an interior airport are the
"functional equivalent of a border search," the Court did not
hold that the search of any people and cargo of airplanes inside
any of the interior airports' installations were the functional
equivalents of a border search.2 12 Indeed, even the three inte-
rior airports that are closest to the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas
that have USBP details stationed in their TSA checkpoints-
located in Brownsville, McAllen, and El Paso-fail to meet the
Fifth Circuit's stricter reasonable certainty standard.2 13 For
210 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20 (1977) (holding that
stops on individuals at the border or at international ports of entry are reasonable
because the individuals entered the country from the outside and because of the
recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations
imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country).
211 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1994) ("Any officer or employee of the Service
authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power
without warrant... within a [one hundred air miles] from any external boundary
of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territo-
rial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance or
vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles from any such external bound-
ary to have access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling
the border to prevent illegal entry of aliens into the United States ... ").
212 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) ("[A] search of
the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a
nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a
border search.").
213 See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe
government must demonstrate with 'reasonable certainty' that the traffic passing
through the checkpoint is 'international' in character."). Since the Fifth Circuit's
standard is stricter and narrower than the Ninth Circuit's, these three interior
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instance, Figure 1 shows passenger traffic statistics for the last
seven years from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics-a
subdivision from the United States Department of Transporta-
tion-for the Brownsville South Padre International Airport,
where Omar Figueredo and Nancy Morales were stopped.
FIGURE 1214
Year Domestic International Total
2012 80,801 4,117 84,918
2013 88,872 813 89,685
2014 94,828 0 94,828
2015 106,525 123 106,648
2016 100,811 27 100,838
2017 102,629 0 102,629
2018 107,128 0 107,128
In Jackson, the Fifth Circuit overruled its own precedent
after using the reasonable certainty standard and finding that
the classification of the Sierra Blanca checkpoint located in
Texas as a functional equivalent of the border was errone-
ous.2 15 The Fifth Circuit explained that the purpose of the
reasonable certainty standard was to limit the classification of
functional equivalent of the border for those checkpoints that
"intercept no more than a negligible number of domestic trav-
elers."2 16 Considering the Fifth Circuit's purpose behind the
standard, even when international passenger traffic was the
highest in 2012 at the Brownsville South Padre Island Interna-
tional Airport with 4,117 passengers, domestic passenger traf-
fic still accounted for 95.15% of overall passenger traffic at the
airports also fail to meet the Ninth Circuit's standard. See United States v.
Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974), affd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 916
(1975) ("[Alt a location where virtually everyone searched has just come from the
other side of the border, [then] the [interior checkpoint] is a functional equivalent
of a border search." (emphasis added)).
214 Passengers All Carriers-Brownsville, 7X: Brownsville South Padre Island
International (Origin Airport), U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS.,
https: //www.transtats.bts.gov/Data Elements.aspx?Data= 1 [https: //perma.cc/
PW5L-VVKQ] (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
215 See Jackson, 825 F.2d at 854. ("The en banc court now decides that the
Sierra Blanca checkpoint should not have been regarded as a border equivalent.
We further hold that the plenary searches presently conducted at the Sierra
Blanca checkpoint are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").
216 Id. at 860.
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airport.2 17 As such, the Brownsville South Padre Island Inter-
national Airport fails to meet the reasonable certainty standard
of the Fifth Circuit-as well as the less strict standard of the
Ninth Circuit-for the classification of functional equivalent of
the border. Therefore, the border search exception does not
apply to the USBP immigration investigatory stops at the pre-
boarding TSA screening checkpoint at the Brownsville South
Padre Island Airport.
Figures 2 and 3 show passenger traffic statistics for the
last seven years for the McAllen Miller International Airport
and the El Paso International Airport, respectively.
FIGURE 2218
Year Domestic International Total
2012 325,656 128 325,784
2013 334,359 5,448 339,807
2014 374,211 7,488 381,699
2015 385,377 4,909 390,286
2016 347,362 6,217 353,579
2017 326,602 7,627 334,229
2018 338,871 5,173 339,044
FIGURE 3219
Year Domestic Intemational Total
2012 1,399,252 11 1,399,263
2013 1,330,998 41 1,331,039
2014 1,358,028 16 1,358,044
2015 1,350,744 1 1,350,745
2016 1,380,933 23 1,380,956
2017 1,421,551 22 1,421,573
2018 1,587,192 0 1,587,192
217 See supra Figure 1.
218 Passengers All Carriers-Mission/McAllen/Edinburg, TX: McAllen Miller
International (Origin Airport), U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS.,
https: //www.transtats.bts.gov/Data Elements.aspx?Data= 1 [https://perma.cc/
58HR-VRAC] (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
219 Passengers All Carriers-El Paso, TX: El Paso International (Origin Airport),
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANS. STATS., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/




Like the statistics from Brownsville South Padre Island Air-
port, the statistics for these two airports show that their TSA
pre-boarding screening checkpoints would also fail to meet the
Fifth Circuit's standard, even during those years when interna-
tional passenger traffic was the highest. As such, assuming
that USBP evaluated the conditions in these airports located
closest to the border to decide whether to assign details to
them, it is highly likely that all other interior airports will fail to
meet the standards of the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit for
the classification of functional equivalent of the border. There-
fore, the border search exception is most likely inapplicable to
the USBP immigration investigatory stops at the TSA pre-
boarding screening checkpoints.
2. The USBP Immigration Investigatory Stop at the TSA
Checkpoint Does Not Match or Resemble the
Characteristics of a Stop at a Domestic
Fixed Checkpoint
Immigration investigatory stops conducted by USBP of-
ficers at TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoints do not fit the
characteristics of a stop at a domestic fixed checkpoint because
neither, the TSA checkpoints nor the USBP details stationed in
them are permanent or temporary checkpoints as described in
Martinez-Fuerte. First, the congressional mandate authorizing
TSA checkpoints at the airport does not extend the authoriza-
tion to enforce immigration law,2 20 but rather only to detect
and thwart potential attacks and prospective terrorist attacks
by detecting concealed weapons, explosives, or other destruc-
tive substances.22 1 Furthermore, searches at TSA checkpoints
by TSA officers are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
under the administrative search exception because they are
conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme to further an
administrative purpose-"to prevent the carrying of weapons or
explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijack-
ings"222-rather than as part of a criminal investigation to ob-
tain evidence of a crime.2 23 Therefore, any immigration
investigatory stops conducted within the bounds of TSA check-
points with the purpose to obtain evidence of a crime-namely
220 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)-(c) (2016).
221 See Guey, supra note 149, at 521; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a)(1) (2001)
(requiring airports to refuse to transport passengers who do not consent to a
search).
222 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), overruLed on
other grounds by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
223 See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
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illegal immigration224-would be outside the scope of an ad-
ministrative search because the search would be a tool of a
criminal investigation.
2 25
Second, the presence of the USBP details within the
bounds of the TSA checkpoint and their activities do not match
the description of the domestic fixed checkpoints in Martinez-
Fuerte. Although it may be argued that the presence of the
USBP details in TSA checkpoints serves the same purposes of a
domestic fixed checkpoint226 and that prior authorization of a
warrant is not required,2 27 TSA checkpoints lack the core fea-
tures that characterize immigration investigatory stops con-
ducted in domestic fixed checkpoints as less intrusive and
frightening in contrast to those conducted during roving pa-
trols.2 2 8 The Court in Martinez-Fuerte xplained that stops at
domestic fixed checkpoints are less intrusive because travelers
can see that others are being stopped and that there are visible
signs of the USBP officers' authority.229 Furthermore, these
visible signs reassure legitimate travelers that these stops have
a minimum of potential interference with legitimate traffic and
that operations in the checkpoint are conducted in a regular-
ized manner that does not resemble discretionary enforcement
activity, and therefore, legitimate travelers are reassured that
these stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public
interest. 230
Although TSA checkpoints do have warning signs at air-
ports warning travelers about the TSA's authority and all trav-
elers see that every single traveler is searched, there are no
warnings signs at airports informing travelers about the pres-
ence or authority of USBP officers, and travelers see that only a
few travelers-mostly members of minority groups23 1-are
224 See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1996).
225 See Davis, 482 F.2d at 908. Logically, this conclusion means that TSA
officers may not purposely aid USBP officers in any way to conduct their immigra-
tion investigatory stops. See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d
1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an airport pre-boarding screening search
was outside the scope of an administrative search because the search was a tool
of a criminal investigation where law enforcement officers and Flight Terminal
Security (FTS) personnel were working together, and if an FTS officer found crimi-
nal activity while searching passengers, then the FTS officer would get a reward).
226 See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 405 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
227 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
228 Id. at 558 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975)).
229 Id.
230 Id. at 559.
231 See UNCOVERING USBP, supra note 15, at 17 ("The 1-44 data shows that
USBP's arrest practices affect lawfully present noncitizens from all over the globe.
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stopped and questioned by USBP officers.232 Therefore, the
presence of USBP details at TSA checkpoints "bears arbitrarily
or oppressively"23 3 on members of minority groups as a class
because USBP details interfere with a large portion of legiti-
mate traffic2 34-exclusively from members of minority
groups-and their operations are not conducted in a regular-
ized manner that appear to involve less discretionary enforce-
ment activity.235  Ultimately, legitimate travelers who are
members of minority groups are not reassured that these im-
migration investigatory stops are "duly authorized and believed
to serve the public interest."
23 6
Consequently, neither TSA checkpoints nor the presence of
USBP details within their bounds fit the description of domes-
tic fixed checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte, and therefore, the
holding in Martinez-Fuerte that dispenses with the reasonable
suspicion standard for immigration investigatory stops does
not apply in these stops at the TSA checkpoints.
3. The USBP Immigration Investigatory Stop at the TSA
Checkpoint Matches and Resembles the
Characteristics of a Stop Made During
a Roving Patrol
Since USBP immigration investigatory stops at TSA pre-
boarding screening checkpoints do not fall under the other two
categories of immigration investigatory stops, these stops must
fall under the category of roving patrols described by the Su-
preme Court in Brignoni-Ponce. This conclusion is supported
by the manner in which USBP officers conduct these stops
because officers do not approach every single traveler at TSA
checkpoints23 7 and actually only target specific travelers-
The greatest impact, however, appears to be on noncitizens of color. The vast
majority of those wrongfully arrested were from South Asian, East Asian, African,
and Caribbean backgrounds." (footnotes omitted)).
232 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163, at 54-55 (describing that there are no warning signs alerting to the presence,
purpose, procedure, or authority of USBP officers at the airport).
233 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
234 According the Bureau of Transportation statistics of the Department of
Transportation for Brownsville South Padre International Airport, McAllen Miller
International Airport, and El Paso International Airport, nearly 95-99% of passen-
ger traffic was domestic for the last seven years. See supra Figures 1-3. There-
fore, USBP officers overwhelmingly interfere with legitimate traffic.
235 See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
236 IJ
237 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note




most, if not all, members of minority groups238-in part be-
cause of the approval of the use of "Hispanic appearance" as a
valid factor in the analysis.239
Whenever USBP officers approach travelers within the
bounds of the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint to ask
them questions about their citizenship, these interactions are
in fact stops and not consensual interactions because travelers
are seized under the Fourth Amendment for two reasons: (1)
the compulsory conditions of the checkpoint; and (2) USBP
officers ask questions that elicit a potentially self-incriminating
response from travelers.
First, the compulsory conditions at the TSA pre-boarding
screening checkpoint render travelers objectively "seized"
under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the compulsory condi-
tions at the TSA checkpoint present a completely different set
of circumstances from those found "on the street or in another
public place" where law enforcement officers may approach
individuals and ask them questions without triggering the
Fourth Amendment.2 40 Unlike individuals walking on the
street or in another public place, travelers going through a TSA
checkpoint have their liberty restrained after they yield to the
TSA's "show of authority" to search them for weapons and ex-
plosives.24 1 In effect, travelers are not "free to leave" because
the holding in United States v. Aukai and current TSA regula-
tions render TSA's questioning and searches reasonable per
the administrative search exception once travelers have en-
tered the "secured area" of the airport, after which travelers
cannot elect not to undergo the TSA search.242 In other words,
the travelers' consent to the questioning and searches at the
TSA checkpoints is irrelevant. Therefore, unlike the bus pas-
sengers in Florida v. Bostick24 3 and the workers in INS v. Del-
238 See UNCOVERING USBP, supra note 15, at 17.
239 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975). This
Note argues that the manner in which USBP applies the vague "Hispanic appear-
ance" factor also puts members of minority groups at risk of being stopped for
their immigration status. See infra Part V.B.
240 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) ("[L]aw enforcement officers
do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions .. ").
241 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
242 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
243 501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991) (finding that the "free to leave" analysis for
seizures was not applicable in defendant's situation because his freedom of move-
ment was limited by a factor independent of police conduct-being a bus passen-
ger-even though the police officers blocked the entrance to the bus).
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gado,244 the travelers' freedom of movement is restricted by
state action-the TSA officers and the checkpoint itself-and
not by a factor independent of state action-namely, by being
travelers wishing to board an airplane.
245
Second, when USBP officers ask travelers about their citi-
zenship status, these questions are intrusive because officers
are throwing the travelers' citizenship into question and are
eliciting potentially self-incriminating responses from trav-
elers.2 4 6 It is true that in Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court
found that asking vehicle occupants in a domestic checkpoint
"a brief question or two and possibly the production of a docu-
ment evidencing a right to be in the United States" was not
intrusive.2 4 7 However, the Court made clear that this type of
questioning was not intrusive because "motorist[s] can see that
other vehicles are being stopped, [they] can see visible signs of
the officers' authority, and [they are] much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."2 48 As mentioned
above, none of these warning signs stating the USBP's author-
ity are present at the TSA checkpoint, and most importantly,
not all of the travelers are stopped.2 4 9 Moreover, since the
Court never established what kind of documents would evi-
dence a right to be in the United States, even U.S. citizens-
particularly those with Hispanic ancestry-might be unable to
prove they are rightfully in the country only with their state
244 466 U.S. 210, 219-20 (1984) (finding that workers inside a factory were not
seized when INS agents visited the factory at random and stationed agents at the
exits, while others questioned the workers).
245 See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
246 Undocumented immigrants are not the only ones at risk of giving self-
incriminating responses. See, e.g., Sieff, supra note 50 (reporting about a growing
number of U.S. citizens along the southern border-mostly, if not all, of Hispanic
ancestry-that hold U.S. birth certificates but are being denied passports, jailed
in Immigration detention centers, and entered into deportation proceedings after
being accused of using a fraudulent birth certificate). As Omar's story illustrates,
throwing one's citizenship into question can provoke anxiety and proved to be
more intrusive than believed, especially if it is not the first time this has hap-
pened. See infra, Part III.C; cf. Illinois v. Lldster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004)
("[Illnformation-seeking highway stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove
intrusive. The stops are likely brief. The police are not likely to ask questions
designed to elicit self-incriminating information.").
247 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976).
248 Id. at 558.
249 See, e.g., Transcript of Motion to Suppress Evidence Hearing, supra note
163, at 54-55, 58-61 (describing that there are no warning signs alerting to the
presence, purpose, procedure, or authority of USBP officers at the airport, and




ID. 2 50 And most importantly, in Brignoni-Ponce, the Court re-
quired USBP officers to have reasonable suspicion that an indi-
vidual is a suspected illegal alien before they conduct an
immigration investigatory stop, but they declined to resolve
whether USBP officers "also may stop persons reasonably be-
lieved to be aliens when there is no reason to believe they are
illegally in the country."2 5 1 So, it does not follow that-for those
stops made during roving patrols-USBP officers do not need
reasonable suspicion to stop individuals they suspect only to
be aliens if the officers have no reason to believe they are ille-
gaily in the country.
Hence, whenever USBP officers approach travelers and ask
them questions at the TSA checkpoint, these interactions are
not consensual and constitute a stop. USBP officers essen-
tially "free-ride" on the checkpoint's compulsory conditions be-
cause travelers have already been forewarned of the TSA's
authority, and travelers understand and expect to be ques-
tioned and searched by TSA before boarding their flights. Since
travelers are objectively "seized" under the Fourth Amendment
and understand that they must follow TSA security procedures
to board their flights, they understandably expect to be ques-
tioned and searched by any of the authorities within the
bounds of the checkpoint. Certainly, the common traveler will
not understand which government officers can conduct what
kinds of stops and searches or their permissible scope. Not
surprisingly, travelers will equate following required TSA se-
curity procedures with following instructions and answering
questions from any of the authorities present at the check-
point, especially those coming from uniformed USBP officers
with holstered weapons who address travelers in an authorita-
tive tone.2 5 2 USBP officers are in fact using the compulsory
250 Even the citizenship of those citizens who were born in the United States,
who hold a U.S. birth certificate, and who have served in the military might be
thrown into question. See, e.g., Sieff, supra note 50 (reporting that a current state
prison guard who was a former service member and also, ironically, a USBP
agent, was denied a U.S. passport and accused of using a fraudulent birth
certificate).
251 See United States. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 n.9 (1975) (em-
phasis added).
252 According to the Supreme Court, even though the workers in Delgado were
not "free to leave" without being questioned first, the officers' conduct gave the
employees "no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer." See
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (emphasis added). Unlike the workers in
Delgado, travelers wishing to board their flights do not know whether they would
be detained for refusing to answer the USBP officers' questions about their citi-
zenship because there are no warning signs about the scope of their authority and
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conditions of the checkpoint to elicit answers to their intrusive
questions and travelers will reasonably feel compelled to an-
swer any questions from them, even those that might seem
potentially troubling, under the guise of consensual
interactions. 253
As such, these interactions between USBP officers and
travelers at the TSA pre-boarding screening checkpoint must
fall under the category of stops, and not consensual interac-
tions. Therefore, USBP officers must have objective articulable
facts amounting to reasonable suspicion to conduct these im-
migration investigatory stops at TSA checkpoints. However,
the particular circumstances urrounding the TSA checkpoint,
combined with the manner in which USBP officers to conduct
these stops, make these stops unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
B. USBP Officers Conducting Immigration Investigatory
Stops at the TSA Checkpoint Cannot Possibly
Satisfy the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
USBP officers solely rely on their observations within the
TSA checkpoint to obtain sufficient valid articulable facts that
amount to reasonable suspicion to detain travelers they sus-
pect to be undocumented aliens. This Note argues that, with
the exception of those situations in which USBP officers are
able to discern whether travelers are aliens based on the forms
of identification they show to the TSA officer,2 54 officers cannot
because travelers understand that they must go through the checkpoint and
follow all of the TSA security procedures before being able to board their flights. In
fact, Omar's story illustrates how USBP officers detain travelers who refuse to
answer their questions about citizenship. See Transcript of Jury Trial Testimony,
supra note 176, at 59, 61, 62.
253 The USBP officers' conduct goes beyond what the Fourth Amendment al-
lows. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) ("We have stated that
even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may
generally ask questions of that individual .... ask to examine the individual's
identification.... and request consent to search his or her luggage. . . -as long
as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
required." (emphasis added)).
254 However, in these situations, USBP officers are able to discern the forms of
identification that travelers show at the podiums because the TSA officers allow
them to do so. In other words, TSA officers are complicit in helping USBP officers
investigate criminal activity-namely, illegal immigration-and therefore, their
screening procedures go beyond the scope of the administrative search and such
information must be excluded. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523,
538 (1967); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1973), over-
ruled on other grounds by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007);




possibly satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard solely on
their observations. According to the Supreme Court's decision
in Brignoni-Ponce, the following set of factors would be valid
factors that USBP officers will consider in their decision to stop
pedestrian travelers2 55 at the TSA checkpoint to question them
about their immigration status: (1) characteristics of the area
where they encounter the traveler (proximity to the border,
patterns of traffic, and previous experience with alien traffic);
(2) information about recent illegal crossings in the area; (3) the
traveler's behavior (erratic behavior or attempts to evade of-
ficers); and (4) the traveler's "Hispanic appearance."256 In gen-
eral, since the "area" where these roving patrols are conducted
is strictly within the bounds of the TSA checkpoints, only trav-
eler traffic that is boarding flights from the airport need be
considered.
For illustration purposes, consider the circumstances of
Brownsville South Padre International Airport, where Omar
Figueredo and Nancy Morales were detained. First, the prox-
imity of Brownsville South Padre International Airport to the
border with Mexico is about 5.5 miles,257 and the patterns of
traveler traffic inside the airport are virtually all domestic, and
thus previous experience with alien traffic is negligible.2 58 Sec-
ond, the airport's information about recent illegal crossings
would also be negligible considering that virtually all traveler
traffic is domestic.2 59 Third, although behavior depends on
each particular traveler, the compulsory conditions of the TSA
checkpoint must be taken into account, as well as their effect
on the travelers' behavior. People are not regularly under the
compulsory conditions of a TSA checkpoint, and thus their
behaviors might not be as they would under a setting free of
those compulsory conditions. Accordingly, the same issues
that arise in "drug courier profile" cases are present in these
situations because the behaviors of travelers under the com-
pulsory conditions of a TSA checkpoint might be easily classi-
255 See Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1976)
(holding that "Mexican appearance" alone did not provide the basis for reasonable
suspicion in pedestrian stops).
256 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-87; Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701
(9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979).
257 About BRO, BROWNSVILLE S. PADRE ISLAND INT'L AIRPORT, http://flybrown-
sville.com/about-bro/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/CLE9-MT9Y] (last visited
Sept. 5, 2018).




fled as "nervous," "brisk," or "furtive."260 Therefore, suspicious
behaviors will be difficult to distinguish from "reasonable inno-
cent behaviors" that can be expected from travelers at the
checkpoint.26
1
Finally, USBP officers at the Brownsville South Padre In-
ternational Airport would consider the travelers' "Hispanic ap-
pearance" as a factor in their decision to detain them as
suspected aliens.262 Since airports do not collect information
about the races and ethnicities of travelers, and the domestic
passenger traffic in the Brownsville South Padre Island Airport
in particular is over 95%,263 the population statistics for the
city of Brownsville are the best proxy variable available. Ac-
cording to U.S. Census Bureau, in 2015, the total population of
Brownsville was 177,795 and from that figure, over 166,000
people or 93.1% of the total population identified as Hispanic
or Latino.264 Since over 90% of the population of Brownsville
identifies as Hispanic or Latino and over 95% of travel at
Brownsville South Padre International Airport is domestic, the
factor of "Hispanic appearance" in this area loses its probative
value in the reasonable suspicion analysis in its entirety.26 5
Consequently, "Hispanic appearance" is of such little probative
value that, although it might be relevant, it is not a reliable
factor to justify an immigration investigatory stop at the TSA
checkpoint.266
Since USBP officers conduct immigration investigatory
stops when they are unable to observe sufficient articulable
facts that amount to reasonable suspicion that travelers are
undocumented immigrants, officers are either arbitrarily con-
ducting these stops or relying entirely on the travelers' race and
260 See United States v. Mfllan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Garvin, 576 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 n.1 (N.D. Il. 1983); United States v.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
261 See Flame, supra note 72, at 338; see also United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d
710, 712 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding where a reasonable suspicion factor and its
opposite can both be used by law enforcement officers to justify stopping an
individual, in that case glancing repeatedly and avoiding eye contact with a USBP
officer, then both factors lose their probative value).
262 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-87; United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d
1160, 1160 (9th Cir. 1979); Nicaclo v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
263 See supra Figure 1.
264 Brownsville, Texas (City), STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/place/
Texas/Brownsville/Race-and-Ethnicity [https://perma.cc/SM7Q-8MTT] (last
visited Dec. 1, 2017).
265 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that "Hispanic appearance," just like any other factor in the
reasonable suspicion standard, loses its probative value when it is likely to sweep




ethnicity, and therefore, conducting unreasonable stops under
the Fourth Amendment. Oddly enough, this conclusion was
reached by assuming that USBP officers were using the "His-
panic appearance" factor in the way the Supreme Court in-
tended the classification to be used. But in this next section,
this Note will expose that even the Court's foundations for the
"Hispanic appearance" factor are more astounding-and ab-
surd-than initially thought.
V
THE "HISPANIC APPEARANCE" FACTOR IN THE REASONABLE
SUSPICION STANDARD VIOLATES THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
The "Hispanic appearance" factor in the reasonable suspi-
cion standard set by the Supreme Court in 1975 is an out-
dated, extremely flawed, and stereotypical ethnic classification
that violates the Equal Protection Clause. As explained above,
law enforcement officers conduct investigatory stops by relying
on their observations of an individual's characteristics and
conduct and of the environment where they observe the indi-
vidual, all of which are later considered in the totality of the
circumstances test.2 6 7 In the case of the reasonable suspicion
standard in the context of immigration law enforcement, all
else equal, an immigration law enforcement officer is more
likely to stop an individual with a "Hispanic appearance" than
someone who does not have one.268 Therefore, since this eth-
nic classification exists on the face of the law-a USBP practice
approved by the Supreme Court's opinion in Brignoni-Ponce-
and it "curtail[s] the civil rights of a single [ethnic classifica-
tion] ,"269 the "Hispanic appearance" classification is "inimedi-
ately suspect."
2 70
All racial or ethnic classifications imposed by the govern-
ment must be analyzed under strict scrutiny.
2 7 1 To pass strict
267 See Johnson, supra note 67, at 218.
268 Ironically, Justice Powell, the author of the Brignoni-Ponce opinion, would
have agreed that an ethnic classification such as the "Hispanic appearance" factor
would be found unconstitutional. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978) ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.").
269 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Carbado &
Harris, supra note 42, at 1576.
270 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
271 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
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scrutiny, the government must prove that the ethnic classifica-
tion is a narrowly tailored measure to further compelling gov-
ernment interests.2 72 Although policing the border for illegal
immigration to further national security might be a compelling
governing interest,273 the use of an individual's "Hispanic ap-
pearance" is not a narrowly tailored measure that furthers na-
tional security because the classification is overinclusive,
underinclusive, and the government has never argued that bor-
der security can be achieved through any less discriminatory
alternative.2 74 The "Hispanic appearance" classification is
overinclusive, underinclusive, and extremely troubling for a
number of reasons, but most prominently because: (1) it was
established by the use of misleading population statistics; and
(2) its legal definition is ludicrous and defies logic.
A. Misleading Population Statistics
As explained above in Part II, when the Court first an-
nounced this ethnic classification in Brignoni-Ponce, its first
formulation was "apparent Mexican ancestry."2 7 5 The Court
added this ethnic classification to the reasonable suspicion
standard for searches and seizures of undocumented immi-
grants because the Court concluded that "[tihe likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough
to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor."2 7 6 The only
support the Court had for this broad claim were the population
statistics cited in a footnote within the opinion:
The 1970 census and the INS figures for alien registration in
1970 provide the following information about the Mexican-
American population in the border States. There were
1,619,064 persons of Mexican origin in Texas, and 200,004
(or 12.4%) of them registered as aliens from Mexico. In New
Mexico there were 119,049 persons of Mexican origin, and
10,171 (or 8.5%) registered as aliens. In Arizona there were
239,811 persons of Mexican origin, and 34,075 (or 14.2%)
272 Id. at 227.
273 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (holding that the exigencies of war and the
threat to national security were a compelling government interest that justified
the evacuation and Internment of Japanese Americans during World War II). But
see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) ("The forcible relocation of U.S.
citizens to concentrations camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is
objectively unlawful ... Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has
been overruled in the court of history, and-to be clear-'has no place in law
under the Constitution.'").
274 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
275 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975).
276 Id. at 887.
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registered as aliens. In California there were 1,857,267 per-
sons of Mexican origin, and 379,951 (or 20.4%) registered as
aliens .... These figures, of course, do not present the entire
picture. The number of registered aliens from Mexico has
increased since 1970 .... and we assume that very few illegal
immigrants appear in the registration figures. On the other
hand, many of the 950,000 other persons of Spanish origin
living in these border States... may have a physical appear-
ance similar to persons of Mexican origin.
27 7
Based on this footnote, it can be assumed that the Court rea-
soned that these population statistics of people with Mexican
origin for the states along the southern border were a good
proxy for estimating the probability of immigration law enforce-
ment encountering undocumented immigrants. However, the
Court's use of the term "aliens" and the relevant statistics is
misleading because it erroneously assumes that the percent-
ages of registered "aliens" in the southern-border states are
reliable indicators of the presence of undocumented immi-
grants in the region without having any available statistics on
undocumented immigrants in these states. Hence, the Court
improperly insinuated that since a fraction of registered
"aliens" in the southern-border was of Mexican origin, then an
individual's Mexican origin was correlated to that individual's
probability of being an alien illegally in the country-com-
pletely disregarding the deeply-rooted Mexican American popu-
lation in these states.278 This conclusion lacks not only a
factual, but also a logical basis. This faulty logic led to the
Court's atrocious reasoning for the "apparent Mexican ances-
try" classification and to sanction the USBP's practice of equat-
ing "aliens illegally in the country" with people of Mexican
origin.
To make matters worse, the Supreme Court clearly misun-
derstood-or blatantly ignored-how the Attorney General's
100-mile border definition applies not only to the southern-
border states, but to the perimeter of the entire country, includ-
ing the perimeters of Alaska and Hawaii.2 79 If the Court had
really contemplated how the 100-mile border defimition applied
throughout the country, it would have realized that the "appar-
ent Mexican heritage" classification was sanctioning the in-
277 Id. at 886-87 n.12.
278 See Carbado & Harris, supra note 42, at 1594 ("To begin, the presence of
Mexicans in the United States was largely a consequence of the movement of a
border rather than the movement of people. The delineation of the border was the
result of the U.S.-Mexican war.").
279 See AM. CIVIL LIBERIES UNION supra note 10.
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creased likelihood of every person of Mexican origin living in
most of the densest cities in America being stopped by inimi-
gration law enforcement.2 80 The Court also inappropriately
considered the Mexican/Non-Mexican composition of the entire
population of these southern-border states, rather than the
Mexican/Non-Mexican composition of the population of the
counties affected by the 100-mile definition. Today for in-
stance, according to statistics, the 100-mile "border zone" is
"home to 65.3 percent of the entire U.S. population, and
around 75 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population."28 1 The
Court also blatantly ignored the fact that most counties located
within the "border zone" along the southern border have over-
whelming percentages of Mexican population-effectively be-
coming the majority of the population in these counties
2 8 2-
and that the probative value of "apparent Mexican ancestry" for
illegal immigration was basically worthless.
28 3
Therefore, the Court's assertion that "apparent Mexican
ancestry" was a relevant factor in policing undocumented im-
migration that was supported by the population statistics in
the footnote in Brignoni-Ponce was plainly erroneous. Yet, this
assertion supported by misleading statistics was not the
Court's worst mistake in approving this ethnic classification,
but rather, how the ethnic classification was itself defined and
would be applied by individual immigration law enforcement
officers.
B. Ludicrous Legal Definition
When the Court approved of the government's use of the
"apparent Mexican ancestry" factor in the reasonable suspicion
analysis, it cited to the following excerpt of the government's
reply brief in United States v. Ortiz to support its holding:
280 See Tanvi Misra, Inside the Massive U.S. 'Border Zone', CITY LAB (May 14,
2018), https: / /www.citylab.com/equity/2018 /05/who-lives-in-border-patrols-
100-mile-zone-probably-you-mapped/558275/ [http: //perma.cc/2WPF-ZAD4].
281 Id. However, people of Mexican origin are not the only ones at risk. Any
individual belonging to a minority group in the United States is at risk of being
stopped as an undocumented alien. See infra Part V.B.
282 Compare AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION supra note 10, with Race and Ethnicity
in Texas (Map of Race and Ethnicity by County in Texas-Hispanics), STAT. ATLAS,
https: / /statisticalatlas. corn/state/Texas/Race-and-Ethnicity [https://perma
.cc/S93R-BVTB] (depicting that the composition of the Hispanic population in
most, if not all, of the counties within the "border zone" in Texas consists of more
than 50%).
283 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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The Immigration and Naturalization Service has informed us
that experienced Border Patrol officers look for persons with
the characteristic appearance of Mexican residents, an ap-
pearance that distinguishes those persons from the
thousands of Mexican aliens who lawfully reside in this
country and the thousands of American citizens of Mexican
ancestry. Illegal Mexican entrants commonly appear thin,
their hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in a
characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in
full-cut and coarsely-woven material. Experience has shown
we are told, that illegal entrants may exhibit obvious ner-
vousness or affect excessive nonchalance as they approach a
checkpoint.
28 4
With this excerpt, the government attempted to provide the
Court with some "guidelines" on how the immigration status of
people with Mexican origin is apparent to USBP officers based
on people's physical characteristics like body constitution,
roughness of hands, haircut, or style of dress. Evidently, it is
absurd to believe that any reasonable human being can distin-
guish who is unlawfully in the United States just by looking at
the person's physical appearance, even more so, at the person's
clothing, haircut, or hands. In fact, the government's "guide-
lines" seem to conjure the image of a poor rural laborer rather
than a person with Mexican ancestry-unmistakably, a rem-
nant of the "Mexican brown" stereotype USBP used in its early
days.2 8 5 Indeed, the government's argument that these "guide-
lines" were effective in identifying undocumented immigrants
breaks down by including a simple and obvious factor left out
from them: skin color.
For obvious reasons, the government did not include skin
color in its "guidelines" to avoid the inference that immigration
law enforcement officers were racially profiling people of Mexi-
can origin and associating them with illegal immigration. Yet,
the "guidelines" achieve exactly that result because only some-
one with a darker skin tone fits the description in the "guide-
lines" in such a way to be suspected as an undocumented
immigrant.28 6 If instead, people with light skin color and blue
284 Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 142, at *12- 13.
285 See LYrLE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 10 ("[About 5'5" to 5'8", dark brown
hair, brown eyes, dark compleion ... ").
286 The USBP officers' application of the "Hispanic appearance" factor in their
decision to detain a suspected undocumented immigrant has evolved into some-
thing extremely different from these "guidelines," a factor that includes any ap-
parent characteristic they tend to associate with Hispanics, including skin color.
See, e.g., Yardley, supra note 16 (describing how USBP has even stopped and
refused to let Cameron County Judge Gilberto Hinojosa board a plane to Houston
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eyes fit the description in the "guidelines,"-"appear thin, their
hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in a charac-
teristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in full-cut and
coarsely-woven material"-they conjure the image of a white
farmer, and not an undocumented immigrant.
The term "apparent Mexican ancestry" itself is extremely
problematic because how exactly can someone's Mexican an-
cestry be apparent? Most people in Mexico or of Mexican de-
scent are mestizos, "meaning they have a mixture of
indigenous, European, and African ancestry."287 As the popu-
lation continues to grow, these ancestries mix even further to
the point that, to be able to illustrate the degree to which peo-
ple in Mexico or of Mexican descent are different from each
other, "[ilmagine if people from Kansas and California were as
genetically distinct from each other as someone from Germany
is from someone from Japan."2 8 Clearly, if attempting to de-
fine "apparent Mexican ancestry" ends in utter failure, then
attempting to use "apparent Mexican ancestry" as a tool for
immigration law enforcement is a downright disaster.
To exacerbate this disaster further into a catastrophe,
through time, the term "apparent Mexican ancestry" evolved in
the courts into its current form: "Hispanic appearance." No
court in the country has ever provided any explanation on why
"apparent Mexican ancestry" evolved into "Mexican appear-
ance,"28 9 later equated first to "Latin extraction,"
2 90 and then to
"Hispanic appearance."291 But this bizarre evolution of the
term can be traced back to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brignoni-Ponce, where in the same footnote in which the Court
cited population statistics to support the approval of this eth-
nic classification,292 the Court extended the boundaries of logic
until he stated his citizenship, and also stopped Federal District Court Judge
Filemon B. Vega with his entourage after a USBP officer mistook him for an
undocumented immigrant or a drug smuggler). It would be extremely absurd to
believe that any of these two judges: (1) appeared thin; (2) their hands were rough
and work-worn; (3) their haircut was characteristic; and (4) they were dressing in
full-cut and coarsely-woven material.
287 See Lizzie Wade, People from Mexico Show Stunning Amount of Genetic
Diversity, SCI. MAG. (Jun. 12, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/
2 014/
06/people-mexico-show-stunning-amount-genetic-diversity [http://perma.cc/
CV9G-RCUY]. To complicate matters further, Mexico also has sixty-five different
indigenous ethnic groups, some "as different from each other as Europeans are
from East Asians." IdL
288 Id.
289 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 571 (1976).
290 See United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1979).
291 See Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1985).
292 See supra Section V.A.
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after it stated that "many of the 950,000 other persons of Span-
ish origin living in these border States... may have a physical
appearance similar to persons of Mexican origin."29 3 In other
words, the Court carelessly likened the physical appearance of
people of Spanish origin with those of Mexican origin. Follow-
ing this logic, since the USBP "guidelines" stated that legal
status and Mexican ancestry are apparent to experienced of-
ficers because undocumented immigrants commonly "appear
thin, their hands are rough and work-worn, their hair is cut in
a characteristic fashion, and they are frequently dressed in
full-cut and coarsely-woven material[,]" 294 then legal status
and Spanish ancestry are also apparent to experienced officers
because of exactly the same factors. Such an outlandish con-
clusion cannot possibly stand.
Even today, the United States Census Bureau has not been
able to provide a clear definition of what Hispanic origin means:
"Hispanic origin can be viewed as the heritage, nationality,
lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's par-
ents or ancestors before arriving in the United States ...
People who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be any
race."2 95 Further, the United States Census Bureau uses a
code list containing "over 30 Hispanic or Latino subgroups" to
categorize people who identify as Hispanic according to their
national origin.296 As explained above, if Mexican ancestry
alone-with its incredibly diverse makeup of mixed races and
ethnicities-cannot possibly be apparent, how can Hispanic
ancestry-a term that encompasses people of nearly twenty-
one different Spanish-speaking countries around the world,297
each with their own unique mixture of ancestries coming from
all continents-be apparent?298 If no training or experience
293 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886, n. 12 (1975).
294 See Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 142, at 12-13 (emphasis
added).
295 Hispanic or Latino Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/note/US/RHI725218 [https://perma.cc/DZ97-DBR4] (last vis-
ited Aug. 25, 2019).
296 Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/pop
ulation/hispanic-orlgln.html [http://perma.cc/75K6-EGJ2] (last visited Sept. 7,
2018).
297 See Niall Quinn, 21 Spanish Speaking Countries: From Largest o Smallest,
BASELANG, https://baselang.com/blog/travel/spanish-speaking-countries/
[http://perma.cc/P7BJ-QGBA] (last visited Sept. 14, 2018).
298 For example, Just consider the makeup of mixed races and ethnicities from
Spain, from where the term "Hispanic" derives. Hispanic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https: //www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/Hispanic [http://perma.cc/
HQZ2-V6KL] ("[O]f or relating to the people, speech, or culture of Spain. .. ").
Spain has been conquered and settled by a mix of different civilizations through-
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can possibly enable someone to identify an individual's His-
panic ancestry by looking at skin tone or physical traits, how
could training or experience enable someone to identify an in-
dividual's Hispanic ancestry and whether the individual is le-
gally in the United States by merely looking at physical
characteristics like body constitution, roughness of hands,
haircut, or style of dress?
Consequently, since the "Hispanic appearance" classifica-
tion is such an indefinite concept, it is not a surprise that
immigration law enforcement officers are unable to apply the
classification objectively as required by the totality of the cir-
cumstances. As explained in Part II.A, the totality of the cir-
cumstances test constantly runs the risk of becoming
subjective because an individual officer's suspicion may be im-
pacted by the officer's own bias or misperception-whether
conscious or unconscious-and not necessarily by enhanced
intuition obtained through police training or experience.
299 As
a result, USBP officers are likely to have their own interpreta-
tion of who may have a "Hispanic appearance" based on their
experiences not as law enforcement officers but as members of
society, experiences possibly affected by social stereotypes and
institutional practices.30 0 Predictably, USBP officers mostly
stop people of minority groups because "Hispanic appearance"
is typically associated with people with a darker skin tone and
not with white, blonde, or blue-eyed people.30 1 This permissi-
ble profiling should raise concern to populations of minority
groups around the country because 72% of the U.S. minority
population lives within the 100-mile border zone, and those
areas with the highest concentration of minority population are
the same areas where USBP presence is the heaviest.
30 2
out the centuries, from "Visigoths from northern Europe, the Phoenicians, Greeks
and Romans from the Mediterranean region[] and the Moors from northern Af-
rica." Jaime Gonzalez, I'm White in Barcelona but in Los Angeles I'm Hispanic?,
PRI'S WORLD, Oct. 28, 2015, https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-10-28/im-white-
barcelona-los-angeles-im-hispanic [http://perma.cc/5B7H-D6G9]. These racial
and ethnic combinations in Spain alone cannot be apparent. Now consider that
those same racial and ethnic combinations in Spain were mixed further with the
different American indigenous ethnic groups. See id. ("ITIhere are also white
Hispanics, as well as black Hispanics or Asian Hispanics.").
299 See Flame, supra note 72, at 336.
300 See LYrTE HERNANDEZ, supra note 25, at 199-201.
301 See id. at 55-56; UNCOVERING USBP, supra note 15, at 17 ("The 1-44 data
shows that USBP's arrest practices affect lawfully present noncitizens from all
over the globe. The greatest impact, however, appears to be on noncitizens of
color. The vast majority of those wrongfully arrested were from South Asian, East
Asian, African, and Caribbean backgrounds.").
302 See Misra, supra note 280.
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Therefore, neither the "Hispanic appearance" classifica-
tion, nor any of its previous formulations, can withstand strict
scrutiny. Policing the border for illegal immigration to further
national security might be a compelling government interest,
but the use of an individual's "Hispanic appearance" is clearly
not a narrowly tailored measure that furthers national secur-
ity. The classification is enormously overbroad: USBP officers
are more likely to stop and question all people of Hispanic
origin-and of other minority groups for reasons explained
above-for their immigration status only because a few might
be undocumented immigrants.303 The classification is also
enormously underinclusive: USBP officers are likely to ignore
and not stop people from other ethnicities and races not typi-
cally associated with illegal immigration.304 USBP's own data
corroborates that the "Hispanic appearance" classification is
not even an effective tool to reduce illegal immigration:
Between 2008 and 2018, many, many more people with legal
status were taken into custody at the internal checkpoints-
some years, almost twice as many .... During the same
period, apprehensions of people who are deportable dropped
by 50 percent .... A 2017 Government Accountability Of-
fice . . . review of checkpoints requested by Congress also
found that arrests at these sites between 2013 and 2016
were a drop in the bucket-2 percent of total arrests of unau-
thorized entrants in that time.305
CONCLUSION
In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court intended to reduce
the risk of arbitrary and abusive immigration investigatory
stops against people of Mexican origin, but paradoxically, it
ended up sanctioning the USBP's discriminatory practice of
enforcing immigration law enforcement by means of an individ-
303 Id. ("[Slome Arivaca residents started documenting [USBP's] interactions
with locals 1,] ... analyzed 2,000-plus interactions, and found that vehicles with
Latinos in them were 26 times more likely to be asked for ID than white motorists.
They were also 20 times more likely to be sent in for a secondary inspection.").
While it is true that USBP officers stop Hispanics more frequently for their immi-
gration status, this fact is not an example of the classification's success or of the
USBP's accuracy in its application. The majority of illegal immigration policing
occurs in the counties of southern-border states in which, as stated above, His-
panics constitute the majority of the population.
304 Almost half--450/o-of undocumented immigrants are already in the United
States when they go into undocumented status, mostly by overstaying their visas.
The majority of this population is non-Hispanic. Kristin Connor, Updating
Brignoni-Ponce: A Critical Analysis of Race-Based Immigration Enforcement, 11
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 567, 587 (2008).
305 Misra, supra note 280.
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ual's ethnicity. Once the Supreme Court sanctioned the
USBP's ethnic profiling, the classification later evolved into its
current, more vague and imprecise form that correlated His-
panic origin with illegal immigration. Unsurprisingly, the gov-
ernment is now continuously suspicious of people of Hispanic
origin and constantly throws their citizenship into question.
Even after nearly seventy years since the legal doctrine of "sep-
arate, but equal" was abolished, the government still treats
people of Hispanic origin as second-class citizens because of
the outdated, extremely flawed, and stereotypical "Hispanic ap-
pearance" factor that is still enforced and alive today. Moreo-
ver, the term's imprecise and obfuscated definition, combined
with the broad subjectivity with which USBP applies it, puts
the populations of minority groups at risk of the same arbitrary
and abusive treatment.
No better example illustrates the insidiousness of the use
of the "Hispanic appearance" than the USBP immigration in-
vestigatory stops at the TSA pre-boarding screening check-
point. Before conducting these immigration investigatory stops
on travelers, USBP officers need reasonable suspicion. USBP
details at TSA checkpoints are not functional equivalents of the
border and do not fall under the border search exception be-
cause the dwellings of airports are neither international ports
of entry nor functional equivalents of the border-with the ex-
ception of the dwellings of airports where incoming interna-
tional flights arrive after a nonstop flight from foreign country.
Furthermore, the presence of USBP details at the airport are
not domestic fixed checkpoints because, although their pur-
pose is similar, core features of domestic fixed checkpoints that
characterize the immigration investigatory stops conducted
there are not present at the airport.
Hence, USBP officers conduct these immigration investiga-
tory stops in a manner resembling or matching roving patrols,
and therefore, USBP officers must obtain sufficient objective
articulable facts that satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard
before conducting the stops. However, USBP officers cannot
possibly obtain sufficient reliable objective articulable facts
that amount to reasonable suspicion according to the Court's
standard in Brignoni-Ponce because of the particular compul-
sory conditions present at the TSA checkpoints at these south-
ern border airports. Moreover, none of these interactions
between USBP officers and travelers are objectively consensual
because whenever travelers enter a TSA checkpoint, they are
effectively "seized" under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly,
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USBP officers "free-ride" on the TSA checkpoint's compulsory
conditions when they interact with travelers to purposefully
elicit answers from them about their immigration status or to
obtain sufficient information from them to conduct a valid im-
migration investigatory stop, and therefore, travelers have no
option but to relent to the USBP officers' requests for fear of
legal consequences.
The Supreme Court must overrule the "Hispanic appear-
ance" classification pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause
and hold that the USBP immigration investigatory stops at TSA
pre-boarding screening checkpoints in the southern border are
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. These legal is-
sues must raise great concern around the country because
nearly all major U.S. cities are within the "reasonable distance"
designation of 100 air miles of the border, and if the Trump
Administration one day decides to station USBP details in all of
those cities airports, the Fourth Amendment rights of millions
of U.S. citizens and legal aliens that are members of minority
groups will be violated on a daily basis.
1456 [Vol. 104:1401
